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NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

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INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

'WAKH' BOARD OF DIRECTORS MEETS 23 FEB

GF231945 Manama WAKH in Arabic 1455 GMT 23 Feb 82

[Text] Kuwait, 23 Feb (WAKH)--The WAKH board of directors has approved a WAKH project for a transmission network via satellite. The project will be put in operation at the earliest possible date.

During today's regular meeting chaired by Tariq 'Abd ar-Rahman al-Mu'ayyad, Bahraini information minister and chairman of the WAKH board of directors. The board also decided that a special study on an integrated transmission network via satellite will be drawn up by the directors of the news agencies of the board's member countries and will be discussed at their next meeting. The study will then be referred to the board's next meeting.

The WAKH board of directors approved the project to distribute news via the WAKH transmission network so that Arab League offices throughout the world will be linked to the WAKH network. The board decided to reelect Bahraini Information Minister Tariq 'Abd ar-Rahman al-Mu'ayyad chairman of the board. The board also reviewed the general report and approved it.

The board approved WAKH's 1982 budget. It also agreed to amend the article regarding the shares of WAKH member countries to that these shares will be in the same proportion as those in other Gulf information media.

The board of directors reviewed an INA memorandum. It was decided that the directors of news agencies of member countries will meet twice a year at the invitation of WAKH's director general.

The board heard the tribute by the Gulf information ministers on WAKH's information role. The ministers stressed the importance of strengthening this role so that it will serve Gulf and Arab information media.

The meeting was attended by Tariq 'Abd ar-Rahman al-Mu'ayyad, Bahraini minister of information and chairman of WAKH's board of directors; Shaykh Sabah al-Ahmad al-Jabir, Kuwaiti deputy prime minister, foreign affairs minister and information minister; Latif Nusayyif Jasim, Iraqi culture and information minister; 'Isa Ghanim al-Kuwari, Qatari information minister; 'Abd al-'Aziz Ar-Rawas, Omani information and youth affairs minister; 'Abdallah an-Nuways, UAE Information ministry under secretary; Shaykh 'Isa ibn Rashid al Khalifah, Bahraini information ministry under secretary; and Nabil Ya'qub al-Hamar, WAKH director general.

CSO: 4404/297

INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

BRIEFS

FATAH RECEIVES BOLIVIAN REVOLUTIONARIES--Brother Abu Jihan [Khalil al-Wazir], deputy commander in chief and member of the Fatah Central Committee, today received the delegation of the Bolivian leftist revolutionary movement which is currently paying a visit to the PLO. The delegation consists of Comrade (Antonio Alvaro), a member of the Central Committee, and Comrade (Carlos), a member of the movement's foreign relations bureau. The discussion during the meeting dealt with the latest developments in the situation in Bolivia and the revolutionary tide which is being witnessed by Latin America as well as the situation in southern Lebanon and the uprising of our people inside the occupied homeland. [Text] [NC211309 (Clandestine) Voice of Palestine in Arabic 1115 GMT 21 Feb 82]

PLO REPORTEDLY RECEIVES UK MESSAGE--Kuwait--High-ranking Palestinian sources have affirmed to AL-MADINAH that PLO chairman Yasir 'Arafat recently received a message from the British Government delivered to him by British Ambassador in Beirut John Robert. The sources said the message consists of a British offer to declare a permanent truce in southern Lebanon between the Palestinian resistance and the Israeli forces. However, the Palestinian sources added that even though the offer is apparently British, in fact it is a U.S. offer to test the Palestinian resistance and determine its readiness to agree on a comprehensive cease-fire in southern Lebanon. The Palestinian sources stressed that the Palestinian resistance refuses to put down its arms without a price. He added that the PLO may demand as the cost of its approval that the truce be for a specified period not to exceed the end of April. The sources added that the PLO's intention is to create a suitable atmosphere for Egypt. [As published; presumably meaning to permit the final withdrawal from Sinai]. [Text] [GF231615 Jidda AL-MADINAH in Arabic 20 Feb 82 p 1]

TERRORIST REMOTE-CONTROLLED EXPLOSIVES--Several terrorist groups have recently acquired sophisticated equipment from sources in Europe. A hint about the equipment was given in an interview to a Lebanese newspaper last week. The equipment includes automatic explosives which can be activated by remote-control methods, such as radio. This equipment enables the terrorists to take less risk than before, since the explosives can be placed at great distance from the activating source, thus making quick getaway easier. The news about this sophisticated equipment which was purchased in West Germany has prompted the IDF to take necessary measures. [Text] [Tel Aviv BAMAHANE in Hebrew 6 Jan 82 p 2] 9565

KHALID MESSAGE TO NUMAYRI--Khartoum, 18 Feb (SUNA)--President Numayri today received Saudi Ambassador in Khartoum Hasan 'Abdallah al-Qurashi who conveyed to his excellency a message from Saudi King Khalid ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz. The message dealt with developing bilateral relations. King Khalid reasserted in the message his country's continued support for Sudan in all spheres. The Saudi ambassador said following the meeting that he had also conveyed greetings to President Numayri from their highness the princes and senior Saudi officials. The ambassador emphasized that the Saudi-Sudanese relations are deep and that his country rejoices for Sudan's happiness and prosperity and suffers for its pains. He said his country wishes Sudan continued progress and prosperity. [Text] [JN181548 Khartoum SUNA in Arabic 1445 GMT 18 Feb 82]

AMF LOAN TO SUDAN--Khartoum, Feb 9 (SUNA)--President Nimeri has endorsed a loan agreement between Sudan and the Arab Monetary Fund, signed in Abu Dhabi on December 15, 1981. The third renewable loan by the Fund for 1982 to Sudan amount to 1,875,000 Arab dinars and will be used to consolidate the balance of payment. The agreement is deemed effective once the borrower gives notice that he has obtained approval of the concerned authority in the borrower's country. Article III of the National People's Assembly Act authorizes the President of the Republic to ratify foreign loan agreements when the Assembly is not in session. [Text] [Khartoum SUNA DAILY BULLETIN in English 9 Feb 82 p 3]

KUWAIT FUNDS SUDANESE--Juba, Feb 5 (SUNA)--The office of the State of Kuwait here received a list of required equipment and furniture for 'Sabah' Children Hospital in this capital of the Southern Region. The 500,000 pounds hospital is a gift from Kuwait to the citizens of the Southern Region. The Kuwait office has earlier asked the Regional Ministry for Health and Social Welfare to submit its requirements for the hospital in order to inaugurate it as soon as possible. [Text] [Khartoum SUNA DAILY BULLETIN in English 5 Feb 82 p 5]

BULGARIAN-PALESTINE NEWS AGREEMENT--Last night, Yasir 'Arafat met with (Priian Traykov), member of the Bulgarian Communist Party Central Committee and director general of the BULGARIAN NEWS AGENCY. He was accompanied by the Bulgarian ambassador to Lebanon. The meeting which reviewed the latest developments in the Arab arena, paid particular attention to the situation in south Lebanon. A cooperation agreement was signed today between the Palestinian News Agency, WAFA and the BULGARIAN NEWS AGENCY at WAFA's offices. The agreement was signed by the respective directors general of the two agencies in a ceremony attended by the Bulgarian ambassador to Lebanon and the head of the socialist countries' section in the PLO Political Department, 'Umar al-Shak'ah. The agreement includes exchange of news, information and photographs between the two agencies. [Text] [JN171829 (Clandestine) Voice of Palestine in English 1500 GMT 17 Feb 82]
CSO: 4400/151

UNPA DEVELOPMENT EFFORTS ANALYZED

Efforts to Mobilize Peasants Examined

Algiers REVOLUTION AFRICAINE in French No 834, 15-21 Jan 82 pp 19-27

[Article by Zahir Gadouche: "Mobilizing for Production"]

[Text] The Third Congress of the UNPA [National Union of Algerian Peasants] constitutes an event of capital importance for the country inasmuch as its hundreds of delegates represent nearly a million fellahin, who have not missed any opportunity to be very critical of their organization. How could it have been otherwise? The peasant masses know and are now convinced that outside the UNPA, no battle could be engaged, no problem could be solved. This evolution of thinking is the best possible reflection of the level of political awareness and quite a clear concept that is held of the organization.

What was needed was to have an entirely new view of the UNPA, not to misunderstand its field of action, and to link its effectiveness to the political commitment of those who form the essential part of its makeup.

Before the creation of the UNPA, the peasants, especially those of the self-managed sector, were more or less structured within a federation integrated into what the Charter of Algiers calls "trade unions (that) do not have a class-demand objective." This does not prevent it from having planned the creation of "unions" necessary in order better to organize the peasantry, of which the least that can be said is that it was in the vanguard of the struggle against colonialism.

Rising up against the colonial penetration and grasp, the fellahin, opposing the moves aimed at dispossession and monopolizing of the land, constantly revolted, from 1830 on, and were at the front of the popular resistance movements.

But the occupier, in expropriating the land, aimed at breaking the popular resistance, striking heavy blows at the foundations of the organization of society, whose economic and cultural base was put to a severe test.

Its mode of production (community), expressed by the "touisa," made it possible to establish social relationships of production based on both justice and democracy. The colonial power, strengthening its policy of spoliation, thus understood that it would best stifle the national resistance--which nonetheless remained, latent--by disarticulating society by means of violence and the special laws.

At the onset of the armed struggle, the revolutionary movement found in the peasantry, which has always shown a fierce desire to preserve its personality and a remarkable capacity for resistance, a social class too mature to convince, from the mists of time, that victory was to be found at the end of a gun-barrel [as published]. In 1954, it acted as a detonator in the armed revolution, and was the decisive factor in the victory of the struggle for liberation of the people.

This brief historical review was necessary for indicating the stages and contexts that marked the development of the social organization of the fellahin. It can thus explain the spontaneous reaction of the agricultural workers upon independence as they occupied the colonial operations and imposed self-management prematurely. From this spontaneous action followed the decrees of March 1963, instituting a mode of collective management in the agricultural sector (the colonization lands). The Tripoli program had stressed in this regard: "The active rank and file of the war of liberation, of which it bore the heaviest burden, the peasantry, who constitute the nation's overwhelming majority, placed all its hopes in independence. The satisfaction of its material and cultural interests will improve production, will open up a market for industry and will restore stability in the countryside, which was severely afflicted by the colonial war."

Consequently, it was normal to take measures in support of the poor peasantry. This contribution could not be limited to financial facilities alone, though they were essential. Justice had to be examined in its real content, in its historical conception, for outside that aspect, it will not be possible to grasp the profound import of all the decisions that were to be taken in the 1970's.

Therefore, in addition to the measures to reorganize and consolidate the self-management sector, which seemed to have difficulty assimilating laws that today bear marks of antiquity, in addition to the considerable financial aid to the small peasants, who also benefited from remission of prior debts and from seasonal credits, the revolutionary government promulgated the historic laws of 8 November 1971, enacting agrarian revolution.

This event, placed in its true context, takes on the character of a wager, so obviously complex did the nature of such an undertaking seem. Didn't prophets of evil predict catastrophes, "backfires," and resistance in the political sense of the term? True, not even the fiercest partisans of the agrarian revolution were entirely free of scepticism. Anything could be expected.

But people were forgetting the movement of solidarity that the country has experienced whenever it has gone through difficult phases. The generosity of the people is a cardinal virtue that they have never lacked when it proved to be needed.

Solidarity

Solidarity has been expressed by donations of land and financial resources. This has been more a political act than a humanitarian matter. The Algerians' sense of solidarity is exceptional, to be sure; but in this case, there was something that did not at all resemble a movement aroused by a natural calamity or a collective emotion. It was rather a kind of guarantee and adherence given by the people to the political, economic and social choice made by the country.

This highly symbolic action had been seen as the beginning of a profound alliance between the workers of the cities and those of the countryside. This movement can be explained only by the fact that all the social forces are pursuing the same objectives, convinced that only unity of ranks makes it possible to win the victories against hidden forces.

The agrarian revolution, by putting an end to a situation of iniquity and social injustice, has totally upset the social relationships of production and the face of the rural world. By creating the conditions that make it possible to improve the farming techniques, to free the peasants' initiative and to add greater value to their activity, it gives them the means for augmenting their production capacities and consequently increasing their well-being while at the same time consolidating the base of the national economy.

The agrarian revolution, which also aims to change attitudes, has established new social relationships, creating the conditions for a transformation of ways of life and making it possible, through the construction of socialist villages, to have access to the benefits of sociocultural progress, ensuring harmonious and balanced development of the whole of Algerian society.

Once the intoxication of the passion and collective enthusiasm evoked by decisions of this scope has passed, there remains the reality--that is, the laws that have to be translated into deeds. To give material form to the principles of the agrarian revolution is not an easy thing--far from it; its application requires total participation--first and foremost, by the peasantry--from those who are the first to enjoy its benefits. Thus, it was important to carry it out under the best conditions and in all its immediate and more remote implications.

This considerable productive force could not act outside a specific organic framework. The Federation of Workers of the Land had organized the self-management participants, and because of the diversity of the socio-occupational categories who come under the UGTA [General Union of Algerian Workers] and because of the fact that in many areas there is a big gap between the agricultural producer and the other producers (industrial and service) who have a tradition of trade-union struggle, it is experiencing many difficulties in carrying out its mission properly.

Nevertheless, because of the size of the active and inactive population of the agricultural sector, and in view of the fundamental tasks that had to be accomplished--in the first place, the agrarian revolution--creation of a peasant organization had become an overriding necessity.

The party, taking the problems of the fellahin in charge, had decided, from 1971, to intensify its action aimed at establishing the peasant unions throughout the entire country. The work of sensitization, of mobilization, was done by the FLN, of course; but could it constitute a sufficient mobilizing factor? Wasn't the important thing to enlighten the peasantry, to open up to it prospects that are presented only by an organization that is rooted in the rural world and that will be able to win the confidence of a distrustful traditional society, that has convincing political objectives and program of action and is in a position to fulfill them?

There then began, in 1973, membership action as well as a campaign to explain the draft of the UNPA constitution. The organization was not long in being born.

Elections were organized at the level of the faoudjs and the UPC's [Communal Peasant Unions], and in June 1973, the organization already had 646,664 members, distributed among 16,417 faoudjs and 691 communal unions. The party was to initiate operations of broad scope to guarantee the greatest success to the UNPA's constitutional congress.

Table of the Agricultural Land Areas in the Three Sectors

SECTEURS 1) MLAYAS	1ère phase 2)			2ème phase 3)			Secteur socialiste 4)	Secteur privé 5)
	Superficie générale en ha. 6)	Superficie attribuée 7)	Non attribuée 8)	Superficie générale en ha. 6)	Superficie attribuée 7)	Non attribuée 8)	domaines autogérés CAPAM 9)	Petits fellahs (ha) 10)
Adrar	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Ech-Chelef	796.108	796.108	—	36.065	36.065	—	115.236	169.934
Laghouat	12.821	10.795	2.026	1.192	722	470	2.376	14.023,27
Oum El Bouaghi	187.618	187.618	—	41.671	41.671	—	76.119	256.136
Batna	32.704	30.985	1.719	24.130	23.489	641	39.721	461.125
Béjaia	52.110,70	4.022	48.088	2.394,04	8.262,6	158,68	12.597	237.000
Biskra	482.969	5.901	477.068	16.655	4.919	7.115	35.334,45	76.663
Béchar	138,2	—	—	327,6	248,37	78,79	—	3.000
Blida	16.463	4.702	11.760	7.607	3.415	4.192	139.623	23.763
Bouira	39.978,92	16.562,08	23.416	14.418,26	4.711	—	39.948	15.385,49
Tamanrasset	513,45	513,45	—	—	—	—	—	4.135
Tébessa	84.693	78.480	6.213	46.130	35.692	25.254	6.622,50	166.326
Tlemcen	37.024	30.730	5.383	24.485	16.585	7.900	123.675	231.000
Tiaret	121.170	121.170	—	60.375	60.375	—	3.158,31	310.967
Tizi-Ouzou	6.601	1.793	3.317	2.609	2.609	708	18.661	—
Alger	4.014	998	3.016	2.151	737	1.413	41.328	1.730
Djelfa	43.279	43.279	—	5.999	3.774	2.225	9.512	52.954
Jijel	14.819	5.854	8.965	5.148	4.887	261	32.094	146.834
Sétif	27.939	27.939	—	55.566	55.452	114	194.349	368.331
Saida	3.592,43	3.592,43	—	13.739	13.739	—	137.450	160.000
Skikda	16.314	11.803	4.511	11.198	8.964	2.234	52.340	95.104
Sidi-Bel-Abbès	114.374	105.094	9.280	21.687	19.941	1.746	332.189	108.590
Annaba	80.210	15.318	64.892	22.113	11.242	10.871	43.944	27.898
Guelma	138.696	123.675	15.020	41.760	37.937	3.532	94.035	289.769
Constantine	41.060	41.060	—	50.100	48.628	1.472	128.800	111.065
Médéa	18.395	18.395	—	30.178	30.146	032	53.905	529.705
Mostaganem	30.134	22.673	7.461	30.953	26.381	4.572	159.362	179.425
M'Sila	—	—	—	—	—	—	1.400	—
Mascara	26.890	14.356	12.534	32.175	26.633	5.542	176.421	197.574
Ouargla	1.053	—	—	1.218	178	1.040	1.797	59.930
Oran	24.265	7.439	16.826	1.978	1.850	120	82.825	6.956
TOTAL	857.421	562.886	294.535	598.0130	536.234	61.796	2.349.497	2.282.179

Key:

- | | |
|---------------------|--|
| 1. Sectors | 6. General surface area in hectares |
| 2. 1st phase | 7. Area assigned |
| 3. 2nd phase | 8. Not assigned |
| 4. Socialist sector | 9. CAPAM [War Veterans Agricultural Production Cooperative] self-managed lands |
| 5. Private sector | 10. Small fellahin (hectares) |

This structuring, even before the top-level echelons existed, enabled the Union's organs to tackle the most difficult trials, testing its capacities for resistance, and its members to participate actively in the work of the APCE's [Expanded People's Community Assemblies], making it possible for them to become more clearly aware of their responsibilities and to play a positive part in the accomplishment of the fundamental tasks.

No one is unaware of the fact that the UPC's contributed a lot to the carrying-out of certain studies and investigations of the landholdings, because they had precise knowledge of the land-management systems or of the owners.

Justice and Progress

It cannot be said that the communal unions had an easy task; on the contrary, they usually ran up against bureaucratic phenomena and insufficiency of material means. The UPC, viewed with hostility by the bureaucracy and usually treated as an intruder, centered its efforts especially on the production and service cooperatives and in the agricultural villages. It was in these entities that it was forged, and in the difficulties it suffered that it was able to deepen the peasantry's revolutionary awareness.

Right at the beginning of the implementation of the agrarian revolution and the creation of the cooperative system, a wind of suspicion was felt to blow through the countryside, originating particularly with its detractors, whose social origins are known to everyone but who all the same had connections within the decision-making organs.

With such a relationship of strength, in such a climate, the combat was often on an unequal footing. It was quite easy to heap discredit on an institution that pursues noble aims and that has the generosity to integrate into a traditional society elements which, though new, are nonetheless founded on justice and progress.

Thus it can be noted that the peasant union had to cope with innumerable problems which, though they took any technical or administrative forms, could not conceal their truly political basis.

At the outset, the content of the UNPA's program of action was confined to the organic aspect. In reality, a single approach cannot suffice in itself, for consolidation of the foundation is connected with several factors--namely, the union's participation in the tasks of the agrarian revolution by means of unitary combat, gaining the confidence of the peasants and also the small peasants, and developing credibility to the maximum by means of effective action. Wasn't the important thing to take up the fight essentially on the political front?

The alliance of the workers of the cities and of the countryside is in itself an indisputable political victory, thereby entailing institutionalization of voluntary service, a movement of support for political action. But because of its nonunitary and unintegrated character, voluntary action sometimes only aggravated the contradictions. In certain cases, the UNPA was wilfully ignored in operations that certain milieus wanted to retrieve. This doubtlessly cannot be interpreted in any other way than as a gap left by the Union, which, instead of exploiting this form of alliance so as to consolidate its foundations more firmly, remained totally passive.

The legal and institutional birth of the UNPA in November 1974 marked the start of the long march of an organization whose ambition--7 years ago, now--was to organize 1 million fellahin. As an extension of the party, the UNPA, like the other mass organizations, is an instrument for creating a structural framework for the peasant masses and mobilizing them, so as to ensure the success of all the operations undertaken within the framework of the agrarian revolution and instill the dynamism necessary for the party's policy in the matter of development in general and agricultural development in particular to be expressed in a constant improvement of this sector, on which the other economic sectors are usually based.

In working to raise the peasants' level of awareness, stimulating activities of a cultural character in the countryside, within the socialist villages in particular, and urging the small peasantry to join in the general movement for promotion of the rural world, it is at the same time the best guarantor of the achievements of the agrarian revolution, a vanguard force and the crucible in which new militant energies are forged.

How is the UNPA structured? Since its constitutional congress, the by-laws have undergone several amendments. But the conventional organic scheme has remained almost the same. Thus the faoudj, which is related to the cell echelon of the party, constitutes the base of the vertically constructed pyramid. Next, there is the Communal Peasant Union, which resembles the kasma. The general assembly elects the bureau of the faoudj. Between the two structures, there is the दौरا union. But according to the new draft by-laws, this organ no longer exists, and the old formula is returned to. The UPC, in the logical hierarchical relationship, is the direct emanation of the faoudjs, as of the moment when its members are elected by the entirety of the faoudj bureaus meeting in general assembly at the headquarters of the party's kasma, at voting time. Once it is elected, the UPC elects its bureau, which in turn elects its coordinator. This UPC represents the totality of the communes faoudjs vis-a-vis the enlarged APC responsible for the agrarian revolution. The members have to be proven militants and aware of their responsibilities toward the objectives of the revolution. Likewise, the coordinator of the UPC must be an active party member.

In order for there to be equitable representation in the faoudj and in the UPC, the three categories of members are elected in equal number. Thus there are as many RA [Agricultural Revolution] assignees on them as there are landless peasants and small peasants. Before the voting, the kasma will propose two candidates for each post of responsibility, whether in the faoudjs or the UPC's. The FLN plays a paramount role in the choosing of the men.

Functional Mechanisms

The general assemblies of the structures are the sovereign organs of coordination, study and control. They oversee the effectiveness of the organization, they monitor the conformity of the action in the area of personnel structure, mobilization and animation of the rural masses with the cardinal objectives and the fundamental tasks of the Union. They exercise disciplinary power over the bureaus that they elect and settle the differences that may arise between the members of the bureaus and the coordination people.

The AG's [General Assemblies] study the directives, notes and orientation memos issuing from the upper echelons of the UNPA, the party or the administration. They

also interest themselves in the proposed economic and social development plans and contribute to the enrichment or adjustment of these proposals. They participate, in concert with the public authorities, in the fight against unemployment, and they contribute to improvement of the income and way of life of the fellahin.

Specific Table of Members and Faoudjs

WILAYAS	28/04/1978		31/12/1981		Augmentation 1)		Diminution 2)	
	Adhérents	Faoudjs	Adhérents	Faoudjs	Adhérents	Faoudjs	Adhérents	Faoudjs
	3)		3)		3)		3)	
Adrar	14.277	367	17.233	454	2.956	87	-	-
Ech-Chelef	41.736	1.324	46.775	1.328	5.039	04	-	-
Laghouat	12.549	359	18.290	591	5.741	232	-	-
Oum El Bouaghi	23.995	846	23.497	822	-	-	498	24
Batna	50.018	1.247	48.148	1.382	-	135	1.870	-
Bejaia	27.026	781	22.408	768	-	-	4.618	13
Biskra	18.774	705	21.509	796	2.735	91	-	-
Béchar	3.444	113	5.031	115	1.587	02	-	-
Blida	31.289	886	43.880	628	12.591	-	-	258
Bouira	13.225	637	17.236	674	4.011	37	-	-
Tamanrasset	2.777	97	5.573	191	2.796	94	-	-
Tébessa	38.359	1.657	30.268	1.558	-	-	8.091	99
Tlemcen	26.585	700	25.327	708	-	08	1.258	-
Tiaret	50.140	1.621	60.853	1.702	10.713	81	-	-
Tizi-Ouzou	15.555	728	17.531	693	1.976	-	-	35
Alger	8.501	226	21.566	181	13.065	-	-	45
Djelfa	22.888	1.037	26.454	1.246	3.666	209	-	-
Jijel	18.688	650	19.387	620	699	-	-	30
Sétif	48.268	1.671	44.492	1.585	-	-	3.774	86
Saïda	25.551	1.117	39.749	1.289	14.198	272	-	-
Skikda	18.243	464	21.344	530	3.101	66	-	-
Sidi-Bel-Abbès	30.070	772	40.168	809	10.098	37	-	-
Annaba	15.072	288	19.528	287	4.456	-	-	01
Guelma	31.503	1.101	33.515	939	2.012	-	-	162
Constantine	17.894	458	18.317	467	435	09	-	-
Medéa	34.245	1.257	32.600	1.210	-	-	1.645	47
Mostaganem	43.378	1.390	42.037	1.235	-	-	1.341	155
M'Sila	22.377	1.177	15.978	715	-	-	6.399	462
Mascara	22.310	529	29.165	650	6.855	121	-	-
Ouargla	12.760	360	13.538	364	778	04	-	-
Oran	8.495	12	15.580	109	7.065	-	-	12
TOTAL	749.990	24.547	840.426	25.140	90.436	593	29.494	1.434

Key:

1. Increase 2. Decrease 3. Members

These functional mechanisms as a whole are conceived in such a way that there is a close relationship between the Union and the party, whose role is to spark, guide and monitor it.

Immediately after the congress, which is sovereign, comes the National Council, which is the supreme body between two congresses. The Council is the agent of the will of the congress and it is the organ of direction, coordination and monitoring of the activities of the UNPA. It is composed of the coordinators of the bureaus of the wilaya unions and has 105 members. Elected for 4 years, it oversees the application of the orientations of the congress, and monitors the action of the national secretariat as well as the management of the finances of the UNPA. Together with the party and the ministries concerned, it works out the means for overcoming the obstacles the fellahin face and for responding to the recommendations of the rank-and-file organs of the Union, especially in the areas of application of the agrarian revolution and the modernization of agriculture.

The National Secretariat, coming just below the National Council, is the Council's executive organ. In this capacity, it sees to the application of the National Council's decisions, while at the same time being responsible to it. The executive bureau, composed of 15 members (previously 7), is responsible for preparation and circulation of the instructions and guideline memos necessary for the proper functioning of the organization at all levels and application of the decisions of the congress and of the National Council.


Since the constitutional congress of November 1974, the UNPA has striven to strengthen its rank and file considerably, attempting to broaden it as much as possible. Even though bureaucratic lines of force have, for some very specific reasons, attempted to put the organization on the sidelines, it has tried as well as it could to respond to the legitimate aspirations of the peasant masses.

The organization's good fortune is that it has participated in the historic events of the nation's life--events that have helped to raise the level of political awareness of the fellahin. Indeed, 2 years after its founding, the organization was to experience some moments of rare intensity, since it collaborated broadly, by ongoing mobilization of the masses, in the enrichment of the National Charter. No one today doubts that the debate on the main principles of the National Charter, which is the party's text of reference and political inspiration, constituted a turning-point for the UNPA. This was also the beginning of a process that was to result in "constitutional legitimacy," following upon "revolutionary legitimacy."

The organization's second congress, held in a spirit of deepening its work, took place in a period marked mainly by the rounding-out of the institutions. That is why it is considered today that--looking back on the enriching experience since 1974, and the extremely intensive times it lived through, both within itself and around it--the Union should no longer be considered a young organization, in justification of the indulgence that has often been shown it.

On 24 April 1978, 1,054 delegates were the elected spokespersons for thousands of peasants, to express their concerns to the highest authorities of the country. It will be recalled that the hall of the Club des Pins, the scene of events that concern the life of the nation, was not full of white collars this time but rather turbans.

Cooperatives Set up
(as of 31 December 1981)



Key:

1. Agricultural Production Cooperative of the Agrarian Revolution
2. [expansion unknown]
3. Fruit and Vegetable Cooperative
4. Self-managed farms
5. War Veterans Agricultural Production Cooperative

The debates undertaken on fundamental subjects were to make even the most sceptical reconsider their preconceived ideas. The representatives of the peasants had once again seized the opportunity to confirm their political maturity and their understanding of the deepest problems.

The Arlesienne?

Yes, the ideological, political, cultural, economic and social aspects were not taken up incidentally or inadvertently, nor were they simply skimmed over as extra-

polations connected with the debates; rather, they were examined purposively, with the concern to go into them in depth. In any case, reflection of subjects of importance proved necessary in order to open up new perspective and get away from hazy ones, if there were any.

At the second gathering, the delegates dwelt at length on the phenomenon of bureaucracy in everything that constitutes the agricultural sector's environment. Simplification of the procedures and decentralization of certain services was demanded at that time. But decentralization had become for them like the Arlesienne who often gets herself talked about but who is never seen.

The question of production was also at the center of the discussions. The conclusion was reached that the best way to combat the detractors of the agrarian revolution and strengthen the cooperative system is to increase production and improve productivity. This is an axiom that is still raised today. The bad habits, letting things slide, all the negative kinds of behavior reinforce all the prejudices and diminish the fellah's function, which is taken over by certain elements who are the most retrogressive in the most pejorative sense.

The UNPA's action consisted, in short, in getting the peasants to participate in everything that affects them closely or remotely, especially in the matter of organization of work.

Under the pressure of the Union and the party, the administrative and financial procedures were to undergo a simplification, resulting in a lowering of tension that is beneficial for the rural world.

The UNPA has never stopped fighting all of the world's difficulties, with the aim of freeing the peasantry from the heavy constraints that weigh on it.

Two phases have marked the organization. First of all, there was the first mandate, whose essential task was to found an entirely new union and get it accepted by the peasant world. The second stage, with the second mandate, consisted in filling in the gaps and applying the policy in conformity with the country's fundamental choices.

These are two situations entirely distinct from one another. The strengthening of the UNPA has led to its being made a representative and valuable interlocutor vis-a-vis other sectors. Whence the thorough collaboration that has been established between it and the ministries of Agriculture & Agrarian Reform and Housing & Urban Planning and the Secretariat of State for Forests.

Today, no organ takes responsibility for starting an operation affecting the agricultural domain without the party's organization being consulted. This joint approach has made it possible to solve a number of problems, even though points of view have sometimes differed.

Cement


It will never be possible to create industrial projects on agricultural lands without the Union's consent. Concertation in such delicate areas becomes indispensable. A few years ago, complexes were going up on previously farmed fertile lands without anyone's being upset by the mess this caused. Cement lost agriculture some 250,000 hectares of the richest lands.

1) CAPCS : 645

Support Offices

Key:

1. Communal Multi-Service Agricultural Cooperative
2. National Agricultural Equipment Office
3. National Farmers Mutual Bank
4. [expansion unknown]
5. Algerian National Olive Products Office
6. National Office for Marketing Wine and Wine Products
7. Interoccupational Algerian Grains Office
8. Fruit and Vegetable Office



Industrialization also worked another great harm on agriculture by encouragement of exodus and the downgrading of agricultural work, less well-paid than the industrial sector. Thus it is now understood why the UNPA lost 29,494 members from 1978 to 1981 and 1,434 faoudjs disappeared. The situation is a serious one, it is suspects.

Serious examination of this aspect becomes an overriding necessity when one understands that the agricultural population remains a very old one if it is not renewed. Thus, out of 200,000 agricultural workers in the socialist sector (self-managed lands and CAPRA's [Agricultural Production Cooperatives of the Agrarian Revolution]), totaling 3,448,617 ha [hectares], 60 percent are between 60 and 68 years old, and 97,911 have reached retirement age and should theoretically stop working this year. The aging of this population is all the more obvious in that the trend that has developed in recent years is going from the rural zones toward the urban zones.

Thus the UNPA proposed that incentive measures be taken to encourage the fellah's function and to rehabilitate agricultural work, which had been downgraded as a result of sociological phenomena. The other solution lies in mechanization of agricultural production by the introduction of technical progress into agriculture. It was likewise important to improve the occupational level of the human potential. In any case, it is certain the the Third Congress of the UNPA will have to take up this question in depth.

At the Fourth Congress and the Extraordinary Congress of the FLN, the Union strove to represent the peasant mass as best it could and to make itself the faithful interpreter of its concerns. The completion of the establishment of the institutions implies at least one thing: the strengthening of the organizations of a party that is in the vanguard of the struggle.

The congresses and the various sessions of the Central Committee have deepened the concept of the agrarian revolution while at the same time underlining the important role played by the UNPA. Thus, the third session decided on integration of the FNTA (National Federation of Agricultural Workers) within the UNPA. This organic measure is aimed at harmonizing the actions of the organization so as to facilitate the party's role and unify the working methods. It thus led to the workers of the offices (12 in all) coming under Agriculture joining the peasants' national organization.

The various UNPA national council meetings, and notably the most recent ones, have shown the capacity of the representatives of the fellahin to analyze political situations in very specific current frameworks. We have noted in certain members the high degree of politicization that they demonstrated and the very broad view of things that they have. The very democratic character of the discussions they have had with members of the government is not unrelated to the raising of the level of awareness.

One has to believe that the various measures that have been taken by the party in favor of the fellahin in recent times, and with which the UNPA has been associated, of course--measures such as rehabilitation of the agricultural environment; unification of social advantages, taking the form of integration of the agricultural guaranteed minimum wage with the SNMG [expansion unknown]; and the marketing policy, which has sparked several controversies--seem to be yielding positive results, because they have been able to satisfy both the consumers and the producers.

Nevertheless, despite all the efforts made for 7 years, the Union, which has 840,426 members,* not counting the 450,000 of the offices, has not in fact solved

* It was not until 1982 that the target of 1 million members set by the 1974 constitutional congress was reached; and this was because of the various offices' joining.

its problems entirely. It would have done better to carry out its role, in particular, and to accomplish properly the mission assigned to it. For the UNPA today still has the task of strengthening its rank and file, of being the major representative of the peasants, who should identify with it, and of carrying out in a unitary spirit all of the political, economic, social and cultural tasks. It is also its job to succeed in mastering correctly all the means available to the agricultural sector. For one should not lose sight of the fact that the fundamental task of the agrarian revolution is far from completed. It still requires, and continually, ongoing mobilization and concrete political action by the active forces, the UNPA in particular. It is for fulfillment of these objectives that the Central Committee, in its third session, judged it necessary "to strengthen the countries' [as published] national organization (in order to) make it a unified mass organization that will encompass all those who belong to the rural world and work within any and all of these structures." It further adds that "the UNPA, as the National Charter stresses, will have to undertake, with the aid of the structures of the party and of the state, a vast program of explanation, education and membership, so as to become rapidly the organization in which the whole of the rural world joins, expresses itself and takes action." The resolution was written less than 2 years before the sessions of the peasant organization which this time were to be held on the theme of "self-sufficiency."

Efforts to Increase Agricultural Investments

Algiers REVOLUTION AFRICAINE in French No 834, 15-21 Jan 82 pp 28-34

[Article by Y.O.M.: "A Double Mission"]

[Text] The Third Congress of the UNPA, which opened last Monday, 11 January 1982, certainly constitutes an important moment in the mobilization of the Algerian peasants for national development in general, and in particular, for strengthening of the process of upgrading our agricultural resources and emancipation of the rural world.

In 1982, the rate of national population increase, the increased volume of the country's food needs, and optimal allocation of our financial and material resources require that Algerian agriculture, its peasants, carry out fully the political, economic and social role assigned to them by the Revolution in its present and future phase.

There is no need to repeat the fact that food independence remains a political and economic objective of primary importance in our development policy. Covering the food needs, transforming the social and productive landscape of our rural world--these are the two axes of our agricultural policy, so as to reduce as much as possible the cost and volume of our imports of foodstuffs and launch a social process of renewal of the agricultural labor force and limitation of the rural exodus.

Haven't we devoted, in this year's budget, DA 3.25 billion to price support for cereals and semolina, out of the DA 3.86 billion planned for basic-products support? Is it still tolerable in our country, which lacks neither labor nor natural resources, to devote such sums to importation of foodstuffs, which then have to be subsidized so as not to put too big a burden on people's small pocketbooks?

These figures alone militate in favor of increasing the country's nutritional self-sufficiency and diminishing the disparities between agricultural incomes and those

of the other sectors. This in turn requires a reorganization of the agricultural sector--indeed, a search for different operational logics and implementation of the present potentials. These potentials should indeed make it possible, in the matter of vegetable production and by a target date of 1984, to ensure self-sufficiency in dried vegetable, market-garden products and fresh and dried fruits, despite a consequent increase in the demand for these products. As regards cereals, it is mainly a matter of increase yields so as to keep the imports at their present average level (more than 50 percent of national consumption).

These objectives require the carrying-out of ambitious programs, and they fit together within the framework of a national agricultural-development plan, integrated, coherent and long-term, with a view to maximum fulfillment of the population's food needs, promotion of the rural world and achievement of the objectives of economic independence, as is stipulated, for that matter, by the Central Committee's resolution on planning.

After the National Charter, following the resolutions of the Fourth Congress and within the guidelines of the resolutions of its second session, the Central Committee, in its third session, in May 1980, devoted special attention to the development of agriculture, encouragement of the peasants and stimulation of production.

The Central Committee's resolution relative to agriculture thus comes within this serious context. To fuse all the energies, to remove all the constraints, meddlings and interferences, for more dynamic production, favoring the widely consumed foodstuffs--these are the main targets assigned to our agrarian system. Among the multiple aspects of this agricultural renewal, the top priorities go to optimal utilization of the useful agricultural land area as well as to the upgrading of agricultural work by means of coherent and all-around incentivization of young people toward agricultural vocations. All this rested on a varied range of actions designed to revive the agricultural sector:

- restructuring and rehabilitating self-management;
- carrying out the program of the first and second phases of the agrarian revolution;
- encouraging the small peasants.

To let this land perish today, after so much sacrifice, is a scenario that has no place in the nature and logic of our Revolution.

While yesterday the Algerian fellahin fought the armed struggle of the revolution, their role in the building of the country today is a strategic one, for without a sharpened awareness of their responsibilities and a true involvement in the country's social and economic dynamic, all the sacrifices made in the last 20 years to establish the bases of our economy will be altered and in the long run shorn of their meaning, their true political content and their real and so much sought-after economic effectiveness.

The Algerian peasants, in the traditions of struggle so well-rooted in them by the misdeeds of colonialism, know more than anyone else the political, social and economic value of the working of the land and mean to make their contribution to the national development effort. Without revival of Algerian agriculture, it is out of the question to achieve the integration and coherence of the national socioeconomic fabric.

The National Union of Algerian Peasants, which this last Monday began the work of its Third Congress, has the purpose, as a mass organization, of being the framework for mobilization of all the potentials that present themselves within our agriculture and our rural world.

UNPA: the Meaning of a Mobilization

As this new year begins, the UNPA, which has 800,000 members, with the conversion of the old trade-union structures into faoudjs of the UNPA, has above all the purpose of being the framework for an increased mobilization of the peasants around the economic and social objectives of the hour in favor of Algerian agriculture. Since its constitutional congress in 1974, the UNPA has constantly grown stronger on the organic level and has constantly participated in training and in working out solutions relating to our agriculture's major concerns: marketing of fruits and vegetables, restructuring of the self-managed farms, application of the agrarian revolution, popularization work, political and administrative activation, etc, were all areas of reflection and action in which the UNPA asserted itself by making its contribution to resolution of the problems and lifting of the constraints that affect our agriculture and prevent it from elevating itself to its true political and economic dimension.

In its political resolution on the occasion of the third session of the UNPA's National Council, in July 1979, the meaning of mobilization within the organization could be summarized in this excerpt: "The third National Council reaffirms the mobilization of the peasants behind the Political Directorate and within the ranks of the Party of the National Liberation Front, for defense of the socialist achievements. The National Council likewise reaffirms the mobilization of the peasants within their organization, the National Union of Algerian Peasants, for deepening the objectives of the agrarian revolution and for coping with the tendentious campaigns aimed directly or indirectly at doing injury to our socialist options."

Such is still today the meaning and import of the mobilization of which the UNPA remains the appropriate framework and instrument.

In stating its position on all aspects of the national agrarian revolution, in working on a search for and implementation of solutions, the UNPA, as a mass organization, under the aegis of the FLN Party, has proven to be a force that has to be reckoned with, inasmuch as it is rallying, on the political, economic and social levels, the rural world's potentials that are directed toward the construction of the country.

On all occasions on which the agricultural problems were debated, the UNPA has found itself to be an active force in committing its potential for mobilization and sensitization in the service of the general interest and that of our peasants. Doesn't the National Charter specify that "the peasant must take in hand the management of their own affairs, organize to defend their interests and see to correct and rigorous application of the agrarian revolution" within the framework of the UNPA.

At its Second Congress, the organization stressed the necessity of "strengthening the participation of the peasant unions in the management and activity of all the organs responsible for tackling the problems raised by rural development in a general way and by achievement of the objectives of the agrarian revolution in particular."

Indeed, the UNPA today more than ever finds at the center of its concerns, its action and its mission the imperative necessity of doing everything in its power to strengthen the bonds between the peasant and his land. This is the ultimate aim of its prerogatives of animation and political organization of the Algerian peasants. As regards organization, it is a matter of taking all action and fighting with all its political and social might in order for the Algerian peasant to remain faithfully devoted to his land and in order for the land to provide to him a standard of living and income worthy of our era, our Revolution and its socioeconomic and cultural exigencies.

Not only does the UNPA mean to strengthen the bonds between the peasant and the land but also to transform the nature of that bond radically in order to achieve all the expectations of the Algerian rural world. If we want the future generations to be capable of achieving the permanence of our Revolution and the continuity of our historical and sociopolitical choices, the higher interest of the nation requires that the land become again a considerable source of ever renewable resources, the leaven for which is more than ever the Algerian peasant. It is toward the Algerian peasant that all efforts are directed in order for mobilization, stimulation of production, food self-sufficiency, balanced development of the territory and the cultural and social development of the rural world to become concrete, palpable and measurable realities.

Support and Moving Force for Change

Such is the meaning of a mobilization for which it is the purpose of the UNPA to be the driving force, in order for our land and its peasants themselves to achieve this renewal so much sought after.


Content of Action

Mobilizing the peasants and strengthening their bonds with the land within the framework of the overall and planned development of the country constitute a major objective of the organization. This objective must nevertheless be expressed in concrete terms by actions of broad scope in which the UNPA, as a mass organization, has participated in a full, entire and direct manner. The initiative and action of the UNPA in the vast program of revival of agriculture and rehabilitation of its technical-administrative environment fall within the context of implementation and application of the Central Committee's resolutions, especially the one relative to agriculture. In taking its action based on the measures decided on by the higher bodies of the party, the UNPA has taken as its own all the concerns of the Political Directorate and the interests of the peasants and of national agricultural production.

Among the measures in which the UNPA was an active participant, the system for marketing fruits and vegetables has been modified by the ministerial order of 6 July 1980.

In our country, marketing and distribution have always been sensitive and fragile sectors that have concerned the population, the public authorities and the direct producers. The question of the fruit and vegetable trade in particular has been described as the "Achilles' heel of the Algerian Revolution."

Total Amount of Investments (in millions of DA)



Rise in prices? Speculation? Insufficient production? Defective organization? All these are questions such as can be asked indefinitely to throw blame on the situation of our marketing and distribution circuits in our country. Algeria will soon have a population of 20 million, and the problems of distribution have lately been perceived as decisive and determinative as regards the supplying of the citizens and improvement of the quality of life through constant defense of their buying power.

For fruits and vegetables, marketing is a high stake, since full mastery and harmonious development of it remain and will remain a powerful catalyzer of our economic and social development and an important factor in the forward march of our Revolution.

Indeed, until mastery of the distribution circuits for fruits and vegetables is achieved, any policy of price-support development, of defense of the citizen's buying power, would be jeopardized in the long run.--a threat that the partisans of reaction are always waiting for, organizing and provoking, in order to grab consid-

erable profits on an economic level while at the same time attempting to discredit all the organizational and political measures implemented by the Political Directorate.

The stakes in distribution are decisive, for it is a sector that does not wait: either one takes it, puts the means into it and masters it, and develops it in function of clear and precise political and economic objectives in conformity with our choices and our options; or it is taken over by other forces, whose objectives and logic are based quite simply on profit and exploitation of the labor and sweat of others.

Such were the baselines and bounds of the general situation with our marketing system on the eve of the third session of the Central Committee and on the eve of the translation of its resolutions into action through implementation of the instruction of 6 July 1980.

One of the first measures of an emergency character adopted by the Central Committee at its third session concerned the needling problem and system of fruit-and-vegetable marketing, the mechanisms by which its inefficiency was engendered and maintained we know.

Thus the Central Committee recommended "overhauling of the present marketing system, especially for fruits and vegetables, so as to adapt it to the present situation and prepare it for gradual evolution toward full mastery, once the human and material means have been brought together." It specifies in particular that the producers should be enabled to market their production within a contractual framework with third parties.

From July 1980 to the present, the concrete implementation of these two recommendations of the Central Committee, thanks to new practical modalities for marketing of fruits and vegetables, was to rapidly alter the acquired habits, revive production and encourage the producers in a decisive and dynamic way.

While the primary objective remained the revival of agricultural production, the year 1981 has also proved quite positive in this area partly because of the effects of the new distribution modalities contained in the instruction of 16 July 1980.

This instruction, prepared by the MARA [Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform] in agreement with the UNPA, has effectively made it possible to stimulate production even though many negative aspects remain to be contained, overcome and eliminated in future.

"The socialist-sector production unit freely furnishes its production to the CAPCS's, the COFEL's and the OFLA's, to the big stores, the small retailers, the collectivities, the processing industries, and in a general way, to all third parties."

The exclusive rights for the public distribution organisms are cancelled, and the range of buyers of the socialist sector's production is therefore broadened.

Moreover, "the price is freely negotiated and decided on by the production unit and the trading partners as a whole." These provisions did not fail to encourage the producers toward more sustained use of the agricultural capacities and land areas.

But certain parties who found in them a means for realizing considerable profits did not miss the opportunity.

"The decisions of the third session of the Central Committee concerning the lifting of bureaucratic constraints so as to benefit the marketing of fruits and vegetables should be understood as a set of measures that set the objectives of establishment of direct relations between producers and consumers," Nadjem Aissa, secretary general of the UNPA, declared on the occasion of National Fellah Day in 1981, which coincided with the ninth anniversary of application of the agrarian revolution.

Thus, for steady, ongoing application of the Central Committee's decisions, the UNPA has played an important role to achieve total and real adherence to the provisions on distribution of fruits and vegetables. Indeed, the UNPA, in concert with the competent departments and authorities, has tackled the task of working out the coercive and producer-protection measures, for it is aware of the danger. For though the brokers buy at a high price today, tomorrow they will finance and orient production by putting the workers of the land in debt and restricting them to a parasite and dependent role.

The UNPA, as a mass organization, has seen to it and will continue to see to it that this harmful tendency toward actual expropriation of the farming operations is eliminated in the long run by increased control over the wholesale function, by effective and strengthened autonomy of the farms, by energetic action vis-a-vis the retailers, and finally, by a coherent price policy.

As regards organization, what is needed is solid and durable "overpasses" between the agricultural-production sphere and the sphere of realization of the value of that production--an "overpass" that respects and consolidates the interests of the producers and of the citizen consumers. For nothing is more demobilizing for a peasant than to feel and actually be deprived of the fruit of his labor by the mere working of mechanisms for which he is not responsible and in which he is not a predominant agent. For the citizen likewise, it is intolerable that the production effort not have an effect on his standard of living as he swells the bank accounts of certain fruit-and-vegetable "operators."

In the face of all these dangers, the purpose of the UNPA is to be a solid rampart against those who attempt to neutralize the meaning of the actions undertaken to undermine the effort and merit of the Algerian peasant. For it is important that, in accordance with the National Charter, all production-support services--popularization work, supply, financing, marketing, political and administrative activation--adapt to the new situation rapidly, and secondly, that the participation of the small peasants, of the assignees and of the UNPA in the process of decision-making and control of application of the agrarian revolution be further improved.

Another aspect of the UNPA's action falls within the framework of restructuring of the farming estates, rehabilitation of the agricultural environment and the emergence of new peasant collectives. In this operation to improve the texture of our agriculture's socioeconomic fabric, the organization participates in the working-out and implementation of all solutions that go in the direction of the greatest optimality of the existing capacities.

The restructuring of the self-managed farms contains two essential aspects in its conception and execution: "its priority and urgent character...and its impact on

the double plane of promotion of the rural sector and stimulation of the national economy," presidential instruction No 14 of 17 March 1981 states. This circular, specifying the objectives sought and their urgency--rehabilitation and autonomy of management, farm-lands restructuring, enhanced exploitation of resources, improvement of the environment--shows clearly the way to be followed, which is articulated in two phases: the first, around reflection to be crystallized in the form of technical and economic studies or other decision-making aids, and the second oriented toward examination of the solutions decided on and translation of them into concrete form.

In order to get out of the situation experienced (the frequent absence of precise boundaries of a self-managed farm), a double program of action has been called for: first, cartography; then, after establishment of the new unit, material on-site delimitation of it by putting in boundary markers.

This process obviously entails the definitive settlement of all land disputes--enclosures, encroachments, illegal seizures--and of those relative to unwarranted occupation of premises for housing or other use. In this process, the UNPA's action is preponderant inasmuch as it makes possible a sensitization and effective awareness on the part of everyone so as to remove the constraints and blockages that impede the farming estate and its restructuring.

We recall in this regard that right after independence and the departure of the 23,000 colonists, the rapid repossession of these vacant lands resulted in the establishment of about 2,000 self-managed farms. While excessive size drew attention, the necessity of correcting land-structure aberrations was patently obvious: a single farm-estate is sometimes composed of separate 50-km parcels!

The new configuration involves the creation of between 5,000 and 6,000 units, with mother units that will have the appropriate technical, logistic and human resources for coping with the needs of rational exploitation of the new entity. These new units will be created only after settlement of the old accounts, breakdown of assets and liabilities, financial rehabilitation, sharing-out of means of production, and in particular, definition of new peasant collectives.

For the UNPA, the necessary renovation of the management organs of the members of the collectives constitutes an important phase for improving the social and political profile of the people of the land. With the retirement of the elderly workers, the Union's action will be aimed essentially at inducing the young to go into land-related occupations, so that they will instill a new and durable spirit into the rural world.

On the national level as well as the wilaya level, the organization is represented on the restructuring committees that are responsible for carrying out this operation in its double implication: the first, of an economic nature, for the task is to produce more and manage our agricultural potential; and the second, political, inasmuch as the taking in charge of the problems and the management of the farms' affairs will be the job of the new collectives, which will be able to exercise the entire range of their prerogatives thanks to the bringing-together of all the objective conditions for encouraging production and thereby delineating everyone's responsibilities in the development of our agrarian system. With the restructuring of the enterprises, the UNPA's field of action and its assignment of responsibilities is broadened so much the more inasmuch as precise definition of the entirety

of the agricultural-production units remains the very basis for rational and realistic evaluation of our production capacities and the performance to be expected from rigorous application of the three aspects of our agricultural policy: self-management, the cooperative system, and the small fellahin.

As regards the small fellahin, the Central Committee called, in its latest session, devoted to examination of the private sector, for:

- work to reconsider private agriculture and the way it fits into overall national development;
- deployment of all effort for protection of the peasants, encouragement of them, and their prosperity;
- realization of the conditions for mobilizing the peasants in the service of development;
- broadening of the range of the fellah's occupation knowledge and integration of him as an element in the training process, and encouragement of the young to opt for agricultural work;
- encouragement of the fellahin to take all initiatives for intensification of production;
- working for agricultural cooperation to be an expression of the peasants' own will.

Such are some recommendations made by the Central Committee at its last session, in order to increase the efforts aimed at protecting the peasants. This constitutes quite a full program for the UNPA, since it involves translating all these economic exigencies into political acts in favor of the small peasants and mobilization of them within the Union.

Since the human element is decisive for the success of the plan to revive our agriculture, it becomes clear that the UNPA, as support and driving force of the whole of the changes dictated by our Revolution in favor of the rural world and the national economy, should strengthen its rank and file, its structures and its program within the framework of the principle of dialogue and concertation--a fundamental principle that governs the activity and emergence of any mass organization in the conduct of our development and respect for the exigencies of a responsible democracy.

With the emergence of the clarifications, assignment of responsibility to all of the nation's active forces, and sound and real perception of the strategic character of agriculture in the continuance of our promotion and development effort, the UNPA will be capable, as it should, of reinforcing the irreversible process of developing in depth our political and social choices and our economic options. It cannot be otherwise, for what is involved is the future of our agricultural seasons, of our children, and that of the nation, which is at stake in the last analysis.

11267

CSO: 4519/110

PRESIDENT'S OFFICE CLAIMS INTERVIEW 'DISTORTED'

Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 17 Feb 82 pp 1, 3

[Text]

TEHRAN - President Khamenei's office Monday issued a statement in connection with the president's Jan. 29 interview with the Newsweek's Rome Bureau Chief Elaine Sciolino.

The statement said that the news agencies have distorted the interview and have published parts of it under misleading headlines.

Part of the interview carried by IRNA appeared in yesterday's TEHRAN TIMES. The rest is as follows:

Speaking about priorities he said that the first issue was to secure the welfare of the people, especially, the weaker classes of people who, the president said, for many tens of years, due to the disgraceful policies which the American masters dictated to the shah, had suffered.

We intend to give them, the president went on to say, a better situation, and to do away with their poverty. He added that another issue was to take a basic re-examination of the situation of the facilities of the government.

We are inclined, he said, to balance these facilities so that they can answer the needs of our revolution.

President Khamenei said that the grasp and balancing of Iran's foreign policy was also a priority. Among the problems Iran has had, he continued, it was difficult to determine which one was the greatest. The president said that unemployment, high prices and shortage of food-stuffs were all problems

stemming from the imposed war, and he added that "you can find no country with a 17 month war, not facing these difficulties."

Stressing that such problems were not strange for

Iranians and that they were completely foreseeable, the president said "if you think that Iran has no plans to solve these problems, I must say that in direct opposition to this conception, we are busy with efforts which will certainly achieve results and the reason is that if these efforts had not been successful, with this war and with the existence of economic sanctions, our situation would be much worse than this and I foresee that in the near future, at least half of our economic problems will be done away with.

Let me add that the reason why we do not see these problems as being frightening is because our people completely cooperate with the government. First they bear many problems and for this very reason, linkage of problems do not arise and secondly, they help the government to do away with them."

Questioned about the foreign reserves of the Islamic Republic, the president firmly denied western reports concerning Iran's foreign reserves and also said reports of Iran's request for loans from countries such as Switzerland, West Germany and Japan were false. But he said that Iran could not deny

that some day it might get a loan from some country but, he added, that the Islamic Republic was not in an emergency situation to be obliged to get a loan.

Concerning the aftermath of the takeover of the US embassy in Tehran, the president said that he was very happy with that event and today the Iranian people believed that it moved the revolution forward.

He also said that the difficulties incurred by the takeover, such as economic sanctions, were not much compared to what was gained.

The president further commented that by this event the revolutionary spirit of the people became more firm and the Islamic Republic was able to foil the conspiracies of the US in trying to overthrow it.

Questioned about the Islamic judiciary system in Iran, President Khamenei replied that the officials were marking their efforts to complete this system but stressed that in reaching this goal they would not go towards the direction of what existed in the west today. He added instead they would rather move towards sections of Islamic laws which have not been possible to establish up to now.

The president then criticized the Western media about Iran's enactment of judicial laws and said that the Western media mostly emphasized the issue of executions but ignored the situation in

Iran created by the counter-revolutionaries.

He then asked his interviewer whether if she were in a bus which counterrevolutionaries had set on fire and killed some innocent children and wounded several others and she were to survive with fear and struggle, then would she award them with a prize of a pardon?

He then said that it would take a very simple minded person to think that the killing of an innocent person was equal to the killing of a person who had killed that innocent person.

The president continued that at the time of the shah he was a political prisoner among other strugglers but, he added, were those same things which they struggled against existing in Iran today and were those who were today fighting against the government struggling in the same way as those who struggled during the shah's time?

The president said that the shah was asked "why is our wealth given to the foreigners?" "Why are the deprived people not helped?" "Why do the responsible authorities of the regime take enormous amounts of the wealth of the people and gather it for themselves?" but the president added that no such questions existed for the people today.

The president said that the shah was asked about the tortures of SAVAK and the people who died this way but today those who were under

the instigations of the SAVAK and the shah's court were trying to disrupt the internal atmosphere of Iran by killing innocent people and bombings.

President Khamenei then suggested to the interviewer that if she wanted to blame someone who has committed a murder then she should do so with those who had killed such elderly men such as Ayatollah Dastgheib, Ayatollah Madani and children killed in cities such as Shiraz and Tehran.

Concerning the so-called separation of religion and politics and the establishment of the Council of Experts, President Khamenei said religion and politics would remain as one and said that the way of choosing a leader had been clearly provided for in the constitution.

He added that the Council of Experts was a legal institution and it should exist and the fact that it has not met was not natural. The Council for Leadership, the president said, could be from three to five people.

At the end of the interview the president said that the only reason he had so far rejected interviews with American publications was that instead of carrying out their responsibilities as journalists, the Western media were means of political inclination and they changed words and printed them out of context in their publications.

KHAMENI: RISING U.S. PRESENCE 'NOT TO BE TOLERATED'

Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 17 Feb 82 pp 1, 2

[Text] Tehran--Hojjatolislam Seyyed Ali Khamenei has warned that the Islamic Republic of Iran "will not tolerate the ever increasing U.S. presence in the region," reported IRNA after conducting an exclusive interview with the president. The warning came in the wake of the current visits of U.S. Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger to some Persian Gulf and Middle East countries concurrent with the journey of U.S. Secretary of State Alexander Haig to Morocco. He rejected as a wishful thinking of U.S. officials and international media that the travel was only in connection with "selling arms to some countries" and "maneuvering to confront Soviet influence" in the region. We have, but, no doubts that "the real motivations" behind the U.S. diplomacy and strategy are "something else," the president said.

He analyzed at great lengths that the whole U.S. plans behind these present moves and also the relevant past maneuvers had to do with Haig's recent statement that "Islam is the biggest threat in the region."

Khamenei thus asserted that the journeys took place "to confront the ever increasing expansion and influence of Islam and Islamic Revolution" in the region.

We have observed then the whole process of U.S. military show of power, the Rapid Deployment Force, the Bright Star exercises, and now "these suspicious and clandestine moves undertaken by the top U.S. officials," he said.

During all the phases of this whole U.S.-backed process, he added, we have felt that the United States is preparing itself for a fight against the Islamic Revolution.

President Khamenei cautioned the Persian Gulf states against another motive of the visit of the U.S. Defense Secretary, saying that "the increasing U.S. presence in the Persian

Gulf and Oman Sea will not benefit anyone except the U.S."

Never did the Islamic Republic of Iran conceal the fact that its biggest enemy is the United States, he said. We have launched ourselves for a long and a difficult fight with the U.S., he continued.

Khamenei then announced that "we will not tolerate this ever multiplying U.S. presence" in the region.

The president cited the double-standards of the U.S. politics to undertake "defense of the Persian Gulf states" in collaboration with Saudi Arabia while the U.S. also kept Israel strengthening against the Moslems in the region.

He regretted on why the regional regimes could not understand this and wondered on how they failed to counter the real threat which exerts pressure through Israel on the regional regimes: the United States.

How dare the U.S. advocate itself as the defender of the

Persian Gulf and Arab governments and who ever has given it such a courage to set out as a sympathizer of Moslems? he wondered.

Khamenei expressed his deep sorrow on "the careless and indifferent attitude" of the Persian Gulf states in the face of "the aggressive U.S. policies... and a government that brought nothing for the world of Arab and Islam except losses."

The president said Israel, which continues to exist as the greatest problem in the region and the biggest issue faced by the Arabs and the Moslems, is nothing but an evidence of the U.S. crime.

By constantly strengthening Israel, America has succeeded to block unity between the Arabs.

The U.S. has diverted the Moslem mind to the Israeli threat placed right within the Islamic heartland.

America has, therefore, triumphed in keeping these governments pre-occupied by these diversions so that they do

not attend to the much more basic and larger issues of the world of Islam and Arabs.

Fielding another IRNA question, Khamenei said the visit of the U.S. Defense Secretary was "undoubtedly in connection with the Iraqi war imposed on Iran.

The American Hawk missiles, which the U.S. is trying to sell to Jordan, will definitely be not used against the Israeli aircrafts... These missiles will be used by Iraq.

In fact, America is piling up the armament stock in Iraq by sending supplies through Jordan and Egypt, something the U.S. has been always doing since the start of war to date.

If the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council makes the mistake of thinking that the U.S. can create a sense of security in the region, the U.S. will undoubtedly take advantage of the situation to make the council serve U.S. interests.

On allegations that the Council members blocked Iran's export of revolution, Khamenei said the Islamic Republic has repeated at times

that the term "export of revolution" does not mean Iran's interference in the internal affairs of other countries or Iran's plans to master-mind coup d'etat in foreign lands.

The funny games being played in Bahrain cannot be attributed to us.

We are duty-bound by our non-interference policy of Islamic Constitution that forbids us to carry out such acts.

If the Council members mean a non-interference of Iran into their affairs, they should be rest assured that our "export of revolution" means "export of the culture of the revolution" and this is not something that anybody has the power to stop.

SOVIET 'SPYING' STATIONS, ISRAELI ARMS DEALS DENOUNCED

NC041645 (Clandestine) Free Voice of Iran in Persian to Iran 1500 GMT
3 Mar 82

[Commentary]

[Excerpt] Compatriots: TIME magazine has written that the Soviet Union has set up a spying and eavesdropping station in Kuh-e Malek on Iran's border with Pakistan and Afghanistan, that Soviet experts are in charge of its management, that soldiers of the Red Army have donned Iranian military uniforms and are making this spying station operational, and that Khomeyni's Revolution Guards have undertaken the duty to guard this station.

There cannot be any doubt that with his "neither East nor West" Khomeyni has thrown Iran into the lap of the East and is flirting with the West. Some days ago 'Ali Khamene'i told a NEWSWEEK correspondent that the Islamic regime is not prepared to ask for military assistance from the Soviet Union or to hire Soviet advisers and experts to reorganize the army. However, he does not see any objection to purchasing arms from the Soviet Union and that if our interests call for it, we will not hesitate in doing so. These remarks were naturally not new to anyone, as the news published in TIME magazine on the setting up of a Soviet spying station on Iranian territory did not take us by surprise, since we had formerly foreseen these attempts.

When a regime claims that it wants to fight against Israel and its president cables the Syrian dictator, Hafiz al-Asad, that he is prepared to assist him in crushing the Muslim people of Syria and to free the Golan Heights, when Khomeyni's regime intends to go to war with all the regional countries and sends large numbers of our homeland's youths before the cannons so they can open the path leading to Jerusalem, and then secretly colludes with Israel on the purchase of war materiel and spare [parts] for its airplanes and tanks, along with its transactions last year which surpassed \$250 million, it is natural for such a regime and rule to turn to the Soviets for help and to ask for arms and ammunition or to grant them the possibility of setting up a spying base and eavesdropping station on Iranian territory. (?And probably) the trip by Khomeyni's energy minister, Hasan Ghafuri-Fard,

to Moscow and the signing of a protocol on the construction of two power generators--one in Ahvaz and the other in Esfahan--is the preliminary step toward the revival of relations which, during the 3 years of Khomeyni's rule, have not been very warm but they also have never pointed toward coldness either.

An article published some time ago in the Soviet Union's official organ, IZVESTIYA, endorsing Khomeyni's criminal regime was proof that the Soviets are trying, as cautiously as possible, to make the best possible use of the opportunity created for them by Khomeyni and prevent the water from returning to its stream bed--to prevent Americans from once again setting foot in a country which Stalin once called the border of the Soviet Union's security now that there are no obstacles and the possibility exists to calmly step in the footsteps of those who left and slowly take their place. An example of this is the setting up of the Soviet communication and spying station in Kuh-e Malek. After the dismantling of the U.S. eavesdropping stations in the northern part of Iran the Soviets have now replaced them, and they are the ones who have set up communication and eavesdropping bases.

The Soviets are experts in such things, and since they know that time is on their side they are patiently waiting for each fruit to ripen at its own time and then pick it, especially when military assistance and the sale of arms to a regime which is now at war with Iraq is not easy.

CSO: 4640/184

STATUS OF PETROCHEMICAL TALKS WITH JAPANESE UPDATED

Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 21 Feb 82 p 1

[Interview with Mostafa Taheri Najafabadi, deputy minister of oil, date and place not given]

[Text] **TEHRAN, Feb. 20 (IRNA) —**

The Persian daily newspaper, Ettela'at, in an interview with Deputy Oil Minister of the Islamic Republic, Mr. Mostafa Taheri Najafabadi, reviewed the abandoned petrochemical plant project in Bandar Imam Khomeini and Japan's conditions for continuing the project.

According to official statements made by the Iranian government a Japanese delegation from the Mitsui Company will arrive in Iran next week to begin its third round of talks with Iranian officials concerning their joint project at Bandar Imam Khomeini.

In the past Mitsui has not showed much inclination to complete the project after the victory of the Islamic Revolution. The upcoming talks will determine whether the two partners will succeed in jointly completing the plant or not, said the newspaper. To clear up some of the vague aspects of each country's stands Mr. Mostafa Taheri Najafabadi, the deputy Oil Minister agreed to speak to Ettel'at.

Taheri said that there were hopes that the new rounds of talks would begin in a friendly atmosphere and the Japanese would have a positive view in this concern, independent of imperialist policies in the world aimed at pressuring the Iranian nation.

The Japanese partner, he said, had revealed that it would hold discussions with the Iranians in the following framework:

Economic studies, providing food, eliminating capital and financial bottlenecks towards completing the project, payment of principal and side loans, and discussing problems facing the contractors. The views of the Islamic Republic concerning the mentioned framework were, Mr. Taheri added, that it would prove to the Japanese that the project was not only feasible but profitable. In relation to providing food, the Oil Ministry had accepted responsibility to provide the food for the petrochemical workers, specifically the Japanese, on time and on the work site without disrupting work at the plant.

About financial difficulties he continued, the Islamic Republic had accepted to pay the additional capital by paying a low-interest loan to the Iran-Japan petrochemical company. The Deputy Minister then said that the Islamic Republic would agree to pay the principal and side loans if the Japanese agreed to resume construction of the plan as soon as possible and then postpone the repayment of these loans for a reasonable time so that they could be paid through the earnings of the plant. Also he said that the contractors would be paid all of their just claims when agreement was reached over the collection of capital from the Iranian government according to specific criteria.

Questioned if it was possible to at least activate parts of the complex without the Japanese, Mr. Taheri said that as everyone knew, after the Islamic Revolution other plants had started work solely by Iranian efforts and if

Iranians themselves had to pull up their sleeves they would definitely not hesitate. But, he added, the Revolutionary Council had respected the Japanese as the partners in this deal, therefore the Islamic Republic wanted to reach an understanding with the Japanese and to continue cooperation according to existing agreements.

He further said that if in case the Japanese did not agree to resume their activities within a certain period of time, then Iran would request the Japanese partner's permission to start up parts of the complex with domestic experts so that at least Iran could reduce some revenue to pay for the project's current expenditures.

In reply to the question of whether he thought the Japanese partners were stalling in order to leave the plant incomplete, he said that he hoped that this was not true. But he added, sometimes questions were raised if in fact the U.S. or other imperialist nations had forced the Japanese to halt their activities.

Generally, Taheri went on, the Islamic Republic took an optimistic view of the issue but kept in mind that the U.S. would never willingly see the Islamic Republic standing upon its own feet. Thus, he said, Japan should not be influenced by such instigations. The reason for this, he added, was that in the long run it would not be in the benefit of the Japanese since, as a Muslim nation, the Islamic Republic would not free its partner from its obligations.

RESULTS OF PETROCHEMICAL TALKS WITH JAPAN ANNOUNCED

LD030108 Tehran IRNA in English 1715 GMT 2 Mar 82

[Text] Tehran, 2 Mar (IRNA)--The deputy oil minister in charge of petrochemical affairs, Mr Mostafa Taheri Najafabadi, told IRNA reporter today concerning the outcome of the talks held with Japanese partners about the 85 percent complete petrochemical plant in Imam Khomeyni Port. The two partners discussed the ceiling amount of capital to be spent further for the completion of the plant, the means of providing the primary feedstock (NGL gas) and other economic issues for some 30 hours during last week's stay of the Japanese in Tehran.

Mr Taheri said that what was of importance was that what the project needed at this point was to determine the extent of damage done to the plant due to the Iraqi imposed war, providing the amount needed to finish the last 15 percent of the plant, and to pay [word indistinct] the current personnel (?expenses) of the government all by low-interest loan given by the government to the Iran-Japan Petrochemical Company so that construction of the plant would be completed. Mr Taheri added that these were all possible on the condition that each (?partner would) be responsible for their own obligations toward the [words indistinct] to pay loan installments on time and then later receive returns after the plant came on line in the future. The Japanese partner had intended to avoid its previous banking obligations and the issue was discussed without result up to the last moments of the talks, he [word indistinct].

Concerning the amount of investment, the deputy minister said that more lengthy matters were exchanged [as received] and the views of the government was that the country had a plan and a budget for its affairs and could not spend a penny without a specific plan, and he further commented that the amount of investment had to be clarified. But the Japanese were saying that thousands of factors could influence costs and expenses and the final amount of investment for the completion of the project could not be determined. However, he said that the Islamic Republic this time was insisting on the clarification of how much more it should pay for the project since the project price had so many times changed during the last ten years. Mr Taheri said that the Japanese did not come up with the needed figures, and one reason was, he added, that damages caused by the war had not been determined exactly.

Speaking about issues on which both parties agreed, the deputy oil minister said that no problems arise concerning the providing of the NGL gas as the primary feedstock of the plant and all necessary explanations had been given to the Japanese and also the Japanese accepted proposals put forth concerning housing and water. Also concerning the economic studies of the project, the profitability of the project (?was explained) in detail to the Japanese during a separate meeting with Iranian [words indistinct] adding that the Japanese had no motive to pull out of the project in this respect and, as the Japanese (themselves) said, it had been the first time they had been given such organised, reasonable, and precise calculations about the plant.

At the end of this talk he said that it was decided that the Japanese would (?return to) Japan to explain the details of their discussions to the five Japanese companies taking part in the project and then would announce the result of their consultations, paving the way for the next round of talks.

Taheri said that this point should be mentioned: that the Muslim nation of Iran could do anything once it was determined to do so, and he gave assurances that the project would be completed and made use of. He also said that the two partners had agreed that Mr Mohsen Kamali Taqavi act as the general manager of the IJPC.

CSO: 4600/293

SHI'A-SUNNI DISCORD DISCUSSED

PM011405 Brussels LE SOIR in French 25 Feb 82 p 3

[Unnamed "special correspondent" report: "A Threat at the Heart of the Iranian Revolution: Dissension Among Various Types of Shi'ism"--first paragraph is editorial introduction]

[Text] The absence of objective accounts of the course of operations connected with the two camps' refusal to allow foreign journalists to visit the scene makes it impossible to form an accurate idea of the situation on the Iraqi-Iranian front. However, it is known that the continuation of the war is completing the destruction of the economy in Iran, where the number of unemployed has become incalculable and the population is subjected to strict rationing. Similarly, Iraq's debt to its Gulf allies has increased in alarming proportions. But, as the dispatch from Tehran published below shows, it could be religious and ideological factors which have the most influence in the final analysis.

The danger which threatens the very heart of the Islamic Republic of Iran is the development of disputes between the ideological variants of Shi'ism. There are no fewer than nine big Shi'ite schools or schools which have emerged from Shi'ism in Iran: the prosocialist Islamist school, the constitutionalist school, the ("Akhbari") school, the ("Osouli") school, the theosophist school, the Sufi school and the clearly deviant groups: Sheykhism, Babism, and Baha'ism.

Since the Islamic revolution in February 1979 the Sufi, Sheykhi and Babi schools (already decimated) and the Baha'i school have been violently attacked and persecuted. They are surviving underground. The theosophist school, which does not recognize the principle of the "cleric" to be realized until people have fully mastered all the teachings of Islam, is confined to a circle of intellectuals who are among the most brilliant in Iran this century such as (Hossein Nasr), who has taken refuge in the United States and (Djalakeddin Achtiyani), who is in retirement in Mashhad.

The prosocialist school also experienced problems with the regime: Under cover of a return to an Islam like that of primitive times, young intellectuals like (Ali Chariati) or young clerics like (Habibollah Achouri) (executed on 18 September 1981 at Evin Prison in Tehran) advocate a degree of egalitarianism

without opposing scientific progress. This group gave rise in particular to movements like Forghan, responsible for the murder of clerics (Mottahari) (Mofatteh) and so forth in the first few months of the revolution.

The constitutionalist group comprises clerics and Muslim laymen and postulates that power should be in the people's hands, but with the senior members of the Shi'ite Muslim hierarchy having the right to "monitor" or "advise". This group contains great ayatollahs like Shari'at Madari, Qomi and so forth. The latter are living under virtual house arrest in their holy cities.

An Underhand Struggle

Today the real struggle within the Islamic Republic of Iran is between the two factions which have emerged from the ("Akhbari") and ("Osouli") schools. On one side are the (Hodjatis), whose name derives from the Awaited Madi (the Hidden Imam), who refuse to recognize a "spiritual leader" until the Madi has returned to earth to install the "Government of Almighty Allah." They oppose the so-called ("Khat-e Emam") school (supporters of the Imam's league) who accept the principle of "Velayat-e Faqih"--government by a Doctor of Law, recognized as the best, over the Muslim nation's political and spiritual life--in other words, Imam Khomeyni's real supporters.

The (Hodjatis) already have more than 30 years experience of activity under the cover of the struggle against Baha'ism, and after the February 1979 revolution they constituted the initial framework of the Islamic Republican Party. The movement, which also includes most of the members of the Islamic Teachers' Association, is really stronger and more important than the ("Khat-e Emam") among Iranians with some education, but the (Hodjatis) are aware of the charisma which Imam Khomeyni has for the illiterate masses (70 percent of Iran). Khomeyni has for the illiterate masses (70 percent of Iran). Khomeyni's supporters, who cannot do without the (Hodjatis), have realized their growing importance, and Hojjat-ol Eslam (Djannati), who is close to Khomeyni, issued a warning to them during prayers at Qom on 1 November.

The underhand struggle which is going on between these two major factions in the Iranian regime scarcely has any visible effects, but it is reflected in acts of sabotage, partisan appointments, sectarian struggles within the partisans' army, and the purges which are weakening the regime more and more. In face of these two doctrinaire factions a new class is developing: that of the realists, who are already occupying a major place in parliament and the government. While preserving appearances, it is bound of its essence to be far removed from religious fundamentalism.

CSO: 4619/57

IRANIAN DELEGATION VISITS IVORY COAST

Tehran SOBH-E AZADEGAN in Persian 18 Feb 82 p 3

[Text] ISLAMIC REPUBLIC NEWS AGENCY (IRNA)--Hojjat ol-Eslam Movahhedi Saveji, Majlis deputy from Saveh and head of the Islamic Republic of Iran delegation to the Ivory Coast, met and held 2 days of talks with the deputy speaker of that country's parliament. According to the report filed by an IRNA correspondent, Hojjat ol-Eslam Movahhedi during these talks addressed the aims of this delegation's trip to African countries and pointed out that the policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran is to expand relations with developing countries. For that reason, several delegations have been dispatched to various African countries this year.

Hojjat ol-Eslam Saveji then turned to an explanation of the position and foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran, saying: "The Islamic Republic of Iran harbors no intention whatsoever of interfering in the internal affairs of other countries. Thus, the rumors in this regard circulated by the propaganda mills of the West are downright false."

He added that "since the victory of the Islamic revolution there has not been any intervention in the affairs of other countries but some Arab governments, fearing the Islamic revolution, have become frightened and are working against the Islamic revolution of Iran." After Movahhedi concluded his remarks, the deputy speaker of the Ivory Coast parliament, while expressing pleasure at the arrival of the Iranian delegation in his country, said: "We are glad that both Iran and the Ivory Coast share common policy principles and we hope that relations between the two countries will expand all the more in a number of areas."

At the conclusion of these meetings, the delegation members toured various areas of the parliament building. The delegation of the Islamic Republic of Iran also visited one of Abijan's large mosques during the third day of its stay in this country. During this visit, Hojjat ol-Eslam Movahhedi and the other delegation members answered the questions of Muslims on the nature of the shaping up of the movement by the Muslim people of Iran against the colonialist regime of the shah.

CSO: 4640/183

PROFESSOR COMMENTS ON STATUS OF REVOLUTION

GF031723 Tehran International Service in Turkish 1830 GMT 25 Feb 82

[Report on interview with Turkish Professor Yusuf Ziya Kavakci; read by announcer with recorded excerpts]

[Excerpts] Dear listeners, we have had interviews and reportage on various issues with guests who arrived in our country at the invitation of the Islamic regime on the occasion of the Islamic revolution's third anniversary. Tonight we shall be presenting several portions of the interview we have had with Prof Yusuf Ziya Kavakci, one of the lecturers of the Islamic Sciences College of Erzurum University, who was among our guests.

As he was expressing his views regarding the Islamic revolution and after noting that he believed that the Islamic revolution of Iran is a move aimed at overthrowing an idolatrous [taghuti] regime and setting up a new system complying with both Islam and the wish of the people, Professor Kavakci said the following regarding our request for a comparison between Iran's position in international politics now and that it held prior to the revolution: Prior to the revolution, Iran was a very important U.S. arsenal and vanguard in the East. Particularly since my arrival here, I have seen that Iran today has adopted a strong stand against the superpowers--the United States and the Soviet Union--and is exerting strenuous efforts to integrate with the Islamic world. It has actually moved forward in the direction of development without bowing before the forces known as the great powers. I have personally witnessed that both in the ranks of the government and in those of the people, particular attention is being paid to having everything done for an in accordance with Islam.

Asked to express his views regarding developments caused in the region by the armed onslaught the anti-Islamic Iraqi regime launched against the Islamic Republic, Professor Kavakci said: [Begin recording] Ever since the beginning of the war, I have not been able to convince myself that Iraq's attack on Iran is based on any legal or just reason. I have tried to establish what the reason was. However, I have not been able to do so. It is indeed surprising that Iraq has attacked its neighbor--a neighbor with which it has geographical and historic links--for the simple reasons it has given or may still be giving. My view is that this may have been provoked by the superpowers. In fact, it has to be that way. It could also have been a tactic to gain time--that is

to say, to give Saddam an opportunity to deal with unrest within Iraq. My view is that it could have been carried out with a view to settling a domestic affair in Iraq. However, it could also be that it was the result of (?an imposed) recommendation by the superpowers--as it usually is. It has to be that way. That is how I see it. [End recording]

Asked to compare the Iran he had in mind before visiting the country with the Iran he saw during his stay, Professor Kavakci said: A number of mistakes are being made because the news agencies of our countries are not linked and because our sources of information are greatly dependent on the Western news agencies. In the past the executions in Iran were very topical in Turkey with regard to the Islamic Republic. We had the view that there was a chilly atmosphere between the administrators and the people. However, we have witnessed wherever we have been that the administrators and the people are not different entities; they are integrated. This is true to such an extent that the state officials join the ranks of the masses without having bodyguards around them and chant slogans and demonstrate together with the people. Maybe this is insignificant, but one of the ministers arrived here together with his veiled wife carrying his child. There was absolutely no adherence to the principles of protocol which we have gotten so used to after seeing so much of it. I believe this example is enough to explain the extent of the integration of the administrators with the people. Of course, such things are not heard of outside Iran. Either I have not read about them in the press or the newspapers are not printing them. There are so many aspects of the revolution which have not been heard of outside Iran. I believe the masses will describe them as very interesting and nice when they are informed of them.

On the struggle being waged by the Islamic revolution against the communists and nationalists and against those demanding democracy and the liberals and capitalists--and, in short, against all other civil systems--Professor Kavakci said: [Begin recording] In reply to your earlier question I said the Islamic revolution is not well known. Unfortunately, I am also among those who do not know about it. Therefore, I must admit that I do not know much about the struggles being waged within Iran. [End recording]

On the endeavor made by the Islamic revolutionaries to establish Islamic unity against those who intend to use the difference between Shi'ites and Sunnis as a weapon against the Islamic community, Professor Kavakci said: The difference between Shi'ites and Sunnis is a question which is rooted in history and which concerns all Muslims of the world. Naturally, it is not easy to resolve such an intricate problem. However, we have observed here that the officials are taking great care not to bring up the question of Shi'ites and Sunnis as a matter of discussion and not to raise this issue in a manner that would harm Islamic unity. The question has to be taken up seriously and resolved from a scientific viewpoint. It is my view that Shi'ite scientists can learn much from their Sunni counterparts. Likewise, the Sunni scientists can learn from their Shi'ite counterparts.

CSO: 4654/200

BRIEFS

KHOMAYNI RECEIVES MINISTERS--Interior Minister 'Ali Akbar Nateq-Nuri, met with Imam Khomeyni, leader of the revolution and founder of the Islamic Republic of Iran, this morning. During this meeting, the minister of the interior presented a report on the activities of his ministry. Then, the imam of the nation emphasized in his guidelines that the Friday imams of the townships should have close and sincere cooperation with the country's executive officials, so that by means of this mutual cooperation the country's problems and difficulties may be solved in the best possible way. Also this morning, Ayatollah Saduqi, representative of the imam and the Friday imam of Yazd, met with Imam Khomeyni, leader of the revolution and founder of the Islamic Republic of Iran. According to the Central News Unit the Friday imam of Yazd, who had come to Tehran for medical treatment, left for Yazd today. [Text] [LD041142 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian 1030 GMT 4 Mar 82]

RESISTANCE MOVEMENT--Some remarks on Iran's territorial integrity that were attributed to Mr Shapur Bakhtiar in January by the Kuwaiti newspaper AS-SIYASAH, and which were refuted at that time, have now, almost 2 months later, been (?repeated) by (?corrupt) elements of the past regime and those assisting them in attacking the person of Dr Shapur Bakhtiar. The National Resistance Movement of Iran deems it necessary to once again recall that in view of the repeated remarks by Dr Bakhtiar who has rejected, on various occasions, any negotiations or concessions on Iran's territorial integrity. The remarks attributed to him in the newspaper are completely void of truth and a downright lie. [Signed] The National Resistance Movement of Iran. [Text] [NC050914 (Clandestine) Radio Iran in Persian to Iran 1330 GMT 4 Mar 82]

AFGHANIS' ARRESTS CONDEMNED--In further strengthening its solidarity and cooperation with the Soviet Union the Islamic Republic has arrested several thousands Afghan refugees during recent months and has handed them over to Soviet agents on the Tayyebad-Eslamqal'eh border. During the past 4 months more than 200 Afghan refugees were arrested in Esfahan alone and returned to Afghanistan. During the same period, as confessed by the regime's officials, 2,400 Afghanis who had tried to cross the border and seek refuge in Iran were arrested by the guards of the Islamic Revolution and handed over to Soviet security agents as smugglers in Jaranj. Extremely reliable information is in hand which shows that Soviet and Cuban officers are cooperating with the guards of Islam in tracking down and arresting refugees and exiles [panahandagan va avaragan]. Following the revelation of the

arrest and repatriation of Afghan refugees the ruling mullahs, who call themselves the defenders of Islam, claimed in justifying their inhumane and shameless act that all of these Afghanis were smugglers. Moscow Radio, which tries to portray the Afghan freedom fighters and patriots as a group of brigands and smugglers, confirmed the mullahs' claim in its Persian-language program yesterday. [Text] [NC041840 (Clandestine) Radio Iran in Persian to Iran 1330 GMT 4 Mar 82]

USSR ARMS--Israeli sources have announced that they have information in hand which shows that the Soviet Union is giving arms both to Iran and Iraq so that they will continue their war. Political experts do not regard the failure of the efforts by mediation groups to terminate the Iran-Iraq war as being unrelated to the Soviet Union's wish for the war to continue. With the continuation of the war the Soviet Union finds the opportunity to strengthen as much as possible the bonds of the Islamic Republic's dependence on Moscow. [Text] [NC041725 (Clandestine) Radio Iran in Persian to Iran 1330 GMT 4 Mar 82]

INDIAN AMBASSADOR--According to the Central News Unit, the Indian ambassador accompanied by the second secretary in the Indian Embassy met separately this afternoon with Grand Ayatollah Golpaygani and Grand Ayatollah Mar'ashi-Najafi in Qom. Welcoming the envoys, Grand Ayatollah Golpaygani expressed his satisfaction with the existing political and economic ties between the two countries. In reply to Grand Ayatollah Golpaygani's question concerning the condition of Muslims in India, the Indian ambassador said that our two nations were historically linked in the fields of religion, culture and economy and India considered itself to be a friendly neighbor of Iran. The envoy said the colonialists were trying to remove the existing friendship and brotherhood between our two countries by causing disputes and we know that the colonialists are not our friends. In reply, Grand Ayatollah Golpaygani called for an ever-increasing expansion of friendly relations between the Muslims in general and India and Iran in particular. According to the same report, during the meeting between the Indian ambassador and Grand Ayatollah Mar'ashi-Najafi, the latter expressed the hope that the level of mutual relations would be continued. He said we must not pay any attention to foreign countries--the Eastern and Western colonialists are pursuing a policy of dividing us and they have already succeeded in implementing this policy in a number of Muslim nations. What they do is fish in muddy waters. Grand Ayatollah Mar'ashi-Najafi concluded his remarks by reiterating the need for unity and the unity of word between Muslims of the world. [Text] [LD041902 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian 1630 GMT 4 Mar 82]

DETAINEES' RECORDS--Following instructions from Imam Khomeyni, leader of the revolution and founder of the Islamic Republic of Iran, regarding investigation into the condition of prisoners, dossiers of Kazerun prisoners were reviewed this morning. Our correspondent reports that the Shar' magistrate of the Bushehr Islamic Court and the Kazerun Islamic Revolution Court prosecutor met Kazerun Friday Imam Hojjat el-Eslam Imani this morning. The

review of the prisoners' dossiers was then begun at the police station of the province by the Shar' magistrate and the prosecutors of the Islamic Revolution courts of Kazerun and Bushehr. [Text] [GF041800 Shiraz Domestic Service in Persian 1500 GMT 4 Mar 82]

IRAQI DEPORTEES--According to a Central News Unit report, the Islamic Republic of Iran Red Crescent Society has issued the following statement: Following the inhumane deed perpetrated by the mercenary Iraqi regime in expelling our Muslim brothers and sisters, this society has set up a staff headquarters composed of Islamic revolution institutions and organs in order to look after our sisters and brothers and move them to special locations on Baghtaran Province. Since this staff headquarters was set up on Wednesday, 3 March, 440 deportees have been moved into one of the country's camps amid a warm and auspicious welcome by the population of Bakhtaran. All necessary facilities have been placed at their disposal. [Text] [LD042140 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian 1630 GMT 4 Mar 82]

GRAIN ELEVATORS--A 100,000-ton grain elevator has begun operation in the Tabriz Sufian area. During celebrations of the "10-day dawn," a 113,000-ton grain elevator began operations in Mashhad. Four other elevators are scheduled to go into operation in Neka', Jiroft, Semnan and Azna in the first 4 months of the coming Iranian year. [GF041450 Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 15 Feb 82 pp 1-2 GF]

NEW GOVERNORS APPOINTED--The cabinet approved the appointment of Mr Farahmand as the new governor general of Gilan Province and Mr Nasiri as the new governor general of Bushehr Province. [LD040520 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian 1630 GMT 3 Mar 82 LD]

BAHRAINI REGIME DENOUNCED--Tehran, 5 Mar (IRNA)--A statement issued yesterday by Maulana Mohammad Abdus Subhan, the leader of the Union of Bangladesh Islamic Democrats in Dacca, condemns the arbitrary and repressive measures to which the Muslim Mujahidin in Bahrain are being subjected. The statement also revealed the Bahraini regime's plan to torture 12 Muslim Mujahidin in prison cells until death. The statement says that the terrorist actions that are being taken by the Al Khalifah against Bahraini Mujahidin are part of an imperialist plot to liquidate the Islamic movement in the region to serve the interests and monopolies of foreigners and colonialists in the region. The statement also calls on all Muslims and Islamic organizations in the world to take action to save Bahraini Mujahidin in the jails of Al Khalifah. The statement also calls for denouncing and exposing the repression practiced by the Bahraini regime against the persecuted Muslim people of Bahrain. [Text] [GF051054 Tehran IRNA in Arabic 0937 GMT 5 Mar 82]

DOMESTIC MEDICINE PRODUCTION--Health Ministry Undersecretary Dr (Niknezhad) has said that 98 kinds of medicine will be produced in Iran as part of the program to increase local production of medicine during the next 5 years. He said: We will increase production and reduce the imports of medicine. Through the cooperation of [words indistinct], we currently produce 30 kinds of medicine and will increase this number to 98 in the next 5 years. [Text] [Tehran International Service in Arabic 0400 GMT 3 Mar 82 GF]

OFFICIAL TO KUWAIT--An official of the Foreign Ministry of the Islamic Republic of Iran will leave for Kuwait tomorrow to make final arrangements for the war captives families' visitation exchange. It was announced today that Kazem Pur Ardebili, international assistant at the Foreign Ministry and head of the delegation for the exchange of the captives' families of the imposed war, will lead an Iranian delegation to Kuwait tomorrow, Friday, at the invitation of Kuwaiti Foreign Ministry. Kazem Pur Ardebili will be accompanied by a number of officials involved in the exchange of prisoners of war. [Text] [GF041606 Tehran International Service in Arabic 1430 GMT 4 Mar 82]

CSO: 4604/20

FINANCE MINISTER'S NEW POWERS REPORTED

TA220849 Jerusalem POST in English 22 Feb 82 p 1, 2

[Report by economic affairs correspondent Shlomona'oz]

[Excerpts] Finance Minister Yoram Aridor emerged from yesterday's cabinet meeting with two personal victories: the approval of a IS475 billion budget for fiscal 1982/83 and a mandate for sweeping new powers.

Aridor managed to pull this off without presenting the supplementary budget for the current year and without divulging anything about the revenue side of the new budget.

The finance minister's wide-ranging new powers, including supervision of salary rises and manpower, applies to all ministries and all government corporations and authorities within their purview, with the exception of the local authorities. Interior Minister Yosef Burg strongly opposed any intrusion into the latter area, which is his domain, and refused to relinquish any of his control to the Treasury.

Aridor's new mandate, giving him more power than has ever been conferred upon a finance minister, will enable him to implement fully the Treasury's economic programme. For the past few years finance ministers have consistently failed in their efforts to impose a coordiante programme on the various ministres, which have gone their own ways on questions of salaries and manpower.

Aridor was empowered by yesterday's cabinet decision to prepare an amendment to the budget law, spelling out the extension of his supervision over manpower and salaries in almost every government office, corporation and authority.

Aridor will also be authorized to correct existing deviations in budgets or manpower, after consultation with the appropriate minister.

Moreover, any changes in salaries and benefits in any ministry, authority or government corporation, including the local authorities, must be approved by the finance minister, as well as any changes in taxes or fees.

This effectively reduces the power of all the other ministers. The new mandate means that Aridor can intervene in the affairs of the broadcasting authority, the ports authority, El Al and the electric corporation, among others. Treasury

approval will be necessary, for example, before any of these bodies can hire additional manpower or extend more benefits to their workers.

Burg's vigorous opposition to giving up any of his present power on the eve of local elections ensured that decisions on manpower and salaries remain within the jurisdiction of the Interior Ministry. Burg also won the right to reduce the funds given to any local authority which has exceeded its budget allocation. But Aridor is responsible for the local tax systems.

Aridor yesterday stated forcefully that he will not agree to any addition whatsoever to the budget during the year. He told the ministers that IS475 billion is the final figure and already includes the money promised to the religious parties in the coalition agreement, any promises made to various ministries during the last few weeks of budget negotiations and money for the implementation of the 'Etzyoni mission report on the status of teachers.

No request for additional funds will be considered, and such requests will have to be financed through juggling funds already budgeted, Aridor said.

The Treasury is expected to submit its IS40 billion supplementary budget for the current fiscal year, ending in March, within the next few days for a cabinet debate. And the Ministerial Economic Committee is expected to meet soon to discuss the revenue side of the new budget including the possibility of raising the Value Added Tax, partly to fill the government's empty coffers and partly to compensate the local authorities for the recent abolition of the business tax.

A look at the new budget reveals that the government deficit for 1982/83 will reach IS43 billion, as opposed to a deficit of IS10.9 billion. This year Treasury economists hope that the deficit increase will not accelerate inflation and plan to mop up excess cash in the hands of the public by offering attractive savings schemes.

While most of the ministries have had their budgets slashed by anywhere from 1 to 6 percent, the budget of the Ministry of Religious Affairs has grown by 150 percent in real terms, mainly as a result of the coalition agreement. Other increases include the budgets for road building and water projects, and the budget of the Ministry of Economic Coordination, as well as money allocated for taking the 1983 census.

Treasury Budget Director Ya'akov Gadish said yesterday that if the new budget is to be effective, the finance minister must be authorized to deal with all 360,000 employees in the public sector and not just the 70,000 state employees. Gadish also warned that the treasury has a secret list of all ministries that circumvented their budget allocations by using other bodies and corporations in their purviews.

CSO: 4400/151

BACKGROUND ON REHAVYA VARDI GIVEN

Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 11 Jan 82 p 3

[Article by Yosef Tzurriel: "Field Man with an 'Open Mind.'"]

[Text] The new Territories Coordinator Colonel (res.) Rehavya Vardi has three assets: an open mind, few words, and a non-dogmatic approach.

His anonymity will end in a few days after serving for many years as senior officer in the military intelligence and in other capacities.

Rehavya Vardi was born in Kfar Saba, and before he turned 12 he began to wrestle with the Arab problem. This was because of the poor relations with the neighboring Arabs.

In 1945, at age 18, he was put in a Hagana unit which dealt with Arab affairs as part of the Hagana intelligence service. Like many who were recruited for that unit at that time, he has no systematic knowledge of the Middle East, and only knew spoken Arabic.

Yehoshua Palmon, one of the intelligence heads at the time, recalls Vardi as a young man with an "open mind." He was always willing to leave, did his work, and did not resort to "trust me."

When Israel was established Vardi was recruited by the IDF and was assigned to the intelligence. He rose through the ranks and when he felt he had done all he could do in the IDF he retired, and took on various civilian jobs.

His acquaintances said yesterday that the fact that he had always been a "field man" freed him from any "consensus." He was quoted as one who kept saying, "one should use one's head," and was guided by this principle in his work.

His new assignment as territories coordinator came on the heels of a new policy in Judea, Samaria and Gaza, which spells implementing the self-administration as a preliminary step for establishing the autonomy in the two areas.

As a coordinator, Vardi will be the "ears and eyes" of Defense Minister Ariel Sharon in the area, and as before, he will serve as liaison between the minister and the heads of the civil administration in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. As security affairs were separated from civilian affairs, three men--Rehavya Vardi, Menahem Milson, and Yosef Luntz--were given the difficult task of laying the foundation for the autonomy as mandated by the Camp David accords.

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CSO: 4423/90

HOUSING CONDITIONS IN OCCUPIED TERRITORIES IMPROVE

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 12 Jan 82 p 9

[Article: "Housing Conditions Improved in Recent Years in Judea and Samaria According to Statistics Bureau Survey"]

[Text] Housing conditions in Judea and Samaria and in the Gaza Strip have improved considerably in recent years, according to a survey of housing and home furnishing conducted in July through September of 1981. This was reported by the spokesman of the Central Bureau of Statistics.

The data reveals that some 63 percent of homes in the area use gas for cooking as compared to 31 percent in 1974.

Change Particularly Noticeable in Villages

The change stands out in the villages, where 62 percent of the homes use gas for cooking as compared to only 19 percent in 1974. At the same time there has been a considerable drop in use of kerosene for cooking--from 67 percent in 1974 to 22 percent in 1981. Some 45 percent of homes in these areas have running water compared to 24 percent in 1974. The main change is in the villages, where 29 percent of the homes have running water, compared to 10 percent in 1974. A reduction has taken place in use of public source of water, from some 27 percent in 1974 to a mere 9 percent in 1981. Use of kerosene for home heating dropped from 42 percent in 1974 to 24 percent in 1981. The use of wood and coal for heating has gone up.

Washroom

The homes using a multi-purpose room for bathing constitute 51 percent compared to 24 percent in 1974. Some 24 percent of the homes (which have a bathroom with running water) have a bath or shower, compared to 17 percent in 1974. Some 29 percent use solar heating tank for heating bath water and 66 percent use kerosene and wood. Some 72 percent of the villagers in these areas use kerosene and wood for heating water for bathing, and 85 percent of the homes have a toilet (compared to 29 percent in 1974), yet only 20 percent have a wash bowl in the toilet (compared to 13 percent in 1974). Some 92 percent of the homes have an individual toilet while 8 percent have a communal toilet.

Electric Power

Some 50 percent of the homes have electricity 24 hours per day and 31 percent only a few hours per day (from generators operating mostly in the evening). In 27 percent of the homes in the villages there is electricity all the time and 47 percent only a few hours per day. Some 50 percent of the homes in 1981 have three or more rooms compared to 36 percent in 1974. In the villages 46 percent live in homes of three or more rooms, compared to 32 percent in 1974.

Households in the Gaza Strip

Some 71 percent of the homes in the Gaza Strip used gas for cooking in 1981, compared to 15 percent in 1974. The rise is evident in the refugee camps, where 69 percent used gas for cooking compared to 8 percent in 1974. Some 51 percent of the homes have running water, compared to 14 percent in 1974. In the camps the rate went up from 3 percent in 1974 to 40 percent in 1981. The use of public source of water dropped from 24 percent in 1974 to 3.5 percent in 1981. In the Gaza Strip too the use of kerosene for heating went down, from 65 percent in 1974 to 47 percent in 1981.

Home Heating

About 36 percent of the homes did not use heating in the winter of 1981, compared to 21 percent in 1974. In 61 percent of the homes there was a washroom compared to 18 percent in 1974. Yet only 38 percent of the homes had running water in the washroom, compared to 16 percent in 1974.

While 44 percent of the homes use solar heating tank for hot bath, 55 percent use kerosene and wood for that purpose, with 64 percent in the refugee camps. Some 94 percent have a toilet (compared to 79 percent in 1974). Yet only 14 percent have a permanent washing device in the toilet, compared to 7 percent in 1974. Of those, 79 percent have their own toilet while 21 percent share it with others.

Great Change in the Refugee Camps

Some 89 percent of the homes have electricity all the time, compared to 35 percent in 1974. The change is evident in the camps, where the rate went up from 14 percent in 1974 to 84 percent in 1981. The size of homes did not grow significantly in the Gaza Strip. Some 51 percent live in homes of three rooms or more, compared to 49 percent in 1974.

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CSO: 4423/90

MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD IN TERRITORIES DISCUSSED

Tel Aviv HATZOFE in Hebrew 15 Jan 82 p 12

[Article: "Muslim Brotherhood Gains Strength in Territories"]

[Text] The Muslim Brotherhood movement has brought back to religion hundreds of young people in recent months, focusing its activities mainly in the conservative cities--Nablus, Hebron and East Jerusalem, as well as in the villages of North and West Samaria and Mount Hebron.

Arab religious circles have told ITIM reporter in Judea and Samaria, that the recent violent clashes at Al-Najah University in Nablus and at the engineering school in Hebron show that the Muslim Brotherhood is gaining strength in the area, causing consternation in leftist circles, which form a major part of the terrorist organizations. Those same circles have said that behind the "return to religion" there are religious leaders who receive funds from conservative Arab countries, especially Jordan and Saudi Arabia.

The religious leaders are upset by the mass murders by the Ba'th in Syria of their Sunnite brethren who belong to the Muslim Brotherhood. During the Friday sermons in the mosques of Judea and Samaria the leaders of Syria are being accused of mass murder in the name of the socialist left. The residents of Judea and Samaria are Sunnites.

Lately the friction has increased between the Muslim Brotherhood and the left. Against this backdrop the Al-Najah University in Nablus was shut down, after all the leaders in the city and outside the city failed to bridge between the rival camps. Last Saturday the friction caused a bloody clash, when 18 students from both camps were wounded, 13 were hospitalized, and one lecturer was thrown out of a third floor window of Al-Najah. The lecturer, Hassan Sualha, was badly wounded and as a result the school was closed by the trustees until further notice.

This violent incident has caused tension in Nablus, and the ITIM reporter found out that the dignitaries in the area try to restore order with an information campaign in the Arab papers in East Jerusalem. All are calling for "closing ranks for the struggle against the oppression of the Israeli occupation."

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CSO: 4423/90

BRIEFS

TERRORISTS SEEK ASYLUM--Two Arab terrorists based in Lebanon have fled to Israel seeking political asylum, and one said in an interview on Israel Radio's Arabic service broadcast on Friday that the terrorist ranks are plagued by defections. The terrorists were identified as Marwan Muhammad al-Sartawi, of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command, and 'Abd al-Hakim Sulayman Ahmad of Al-Saiqah. Al-Sartawi was quoted as saying he fled from a terrorist prison where he was held for defying his officers. Al-Sartawi said morale was low in the terrorist ranks and many "wait only for their salaries and are not ready to act" against Israel. [Text] [TA221008 Jerusalem POST in English 21 Feb 82 p 1]

PRICE OF PEACE WITH EGYPT--The price of peace with Egypt is equal to a year's Gross National Product, or the entire cost of the Yom Kippur war, Finance Ministry Director-General Prof 'Ezra Sadan said yesterday. Sadan was briefing foreign pressmen in Jerusalem, at a seminar on "The Price of Peace," sponsored jointly by the Foreign Ministry, the IDF spokesman and the government press office. Sadan estimated that the Sinai withdrawal was costing Israel about \$25 billion, exclusive of compensation paid to settlers or the expense of relocating settlements. Money for the latter comes directly from the state budget. All this money has to be found by Israel outside such normal sources of revenue as exports, taxation and foreign aid. IDF spokesman Brig Gen Ya'akov even said that Israel had invested \$17 billion in Sinai for military purposes alone since June 1967. The figure does not include money spent on settlements and other civilian installations. [Text] [TA230937 Jerusalem POST in English 23 Feb 82 p 1]

CSO: 4400/151

UNPROFESSIONAL BEHAVIOR OF NATIONAL ASSEMBLY CITED

Kuwait AL-TALI'AH in Arabic No 723, 23 Dec 81 pp 12, 13

[Article by Dr Ahmad al-Baghdadi: "The Assembly, the Tragedy"]

[Text] A coed student has written the following opinion regarding the members of this Assembly. It appeared under the title "What is Going on Inside the National Assembly?" in the magazine AL-NABRAS, which is published by the University of Kuwait Accounting Society.

"I was delighted by the Accounting Society's announcement about the trip for coed students to the National Assembly. I was among the first to take part since I was quite anxious to visit these important places in the state where all the state officials and representatives of the people are. These gentlemen, however, were as lacking in self-control and seriousness as the subject of the debate was sensitive and important, since I saw certain behavior which I never expected to be on display in the National Assembly. For example:

The representatives and ministers had no respect for one another's point of view. They did not pay attention to these views and were completely preoccupied with side conversations which had nothing to do with the subject of the session.

The president and vice-president of the Assembly were engaged in side conversations and were constantly laughing. They were not following the subject of the session at all since one of the representatives even had to call the president's attention to this by saying, "Mr President, may I have your attention please."

Some of the representatives left their places and went to other seats during the session, all in a disruptive manner and without permission.

One of the ministers came in during the voting on a specific point and voted for the measure without knowing what was being voted upon.

Candy was passed around among the representatives and ministers in a disgraceful manner; one of the members of the Assembly left his place to go get a pack of candy from the table of another representative and then started throwing the contents of the pack around at people for amusement in a very unbecoming manner.

When one of the representatives received permission to give his views on the subject, this delegate spit a peice of candy out of his mouth. I think that this behavior is inappropriate for someone in this position in this setting, which is supposed to be respected.

This, then, is what I saw in that session. I left frustrated and disillusioned about this Assembly, which I had not imagined to be like this. The saying kept going through my mind, 'What you hear about a scoundrel is better than what you see first-hand.'"

Muna Salih Yahya

Accounting Department, First Year

The members of the Assembly should thank God that these comments were not written in the daily press, because if a journalist had published these comical events on the pages devoted to "debates" of the National Assembly, then the members of the Assembly would lose whatever respect they still have left in the eyes of some of the citizens.

The ordinary citizen would be ashamed of doing such tasteless things at somber and serious meetings; so what does he think when members of the National Assembly, where there is supposed to be respect and rationality, do it? Although it could be said that such incidents are minor and are not associated with all the members, the fact remains that keeping silent about them would be tantamount to an unwarranted condoning of them. There is clear and convincing evidence that no good will accrue to the people from this Assembly, which, as we have always said, will not achieve the aspirations of the people of Kuwait in obtaining their freedoms which have been taken away and which the members of this Assembly cannot recover although the Assembly has the ability to do so. As the saying goes, "The one who remains silent about the truth is a silent devil."

There is another observation which we would like to make in this article and that is that there has been a lot of talk during the past few days that the National Assembly's debate of the government's programs has reached a splendid level for the first time. There is a great deal of blindness in this and reality is being covered by a veil. We do not deny that the members of the Assembly directed questions to the ministers concerned and debated with them, but we cannot say that they were driving home their points. Let us give an example of this. The press accounts that the members of the Assembly rejected the concept of an intermediary in the agencies of the Ministry of Health came at the very time when the undersecretary of the Ministry of Health itself announced that the sick who were being sent to London for treatment would be chosen by means of an intermediary. This was a significant statement, but not one of the members touched on it. It was their duty to ask the minister and the undersecretary about the accuracy of this statement; in fact, they should have demanded the formation of a fact-finding committee to deal with this important subject. However, the lack of attention was totally clear in not pressing the minister and the undersecretary. Another example revolves around the representatives' demand to put a stop to the measures which were adopted against the employees of the Civil Aviation Organization who had demanded improved working conditions. The organization transferred some of them to other locations, reduced their pay grades and gave them warnings. Why did not the members put detailed questions to the Minister of Communications about

this matter and ask for an investigation into the validity of these demands. That way the minister could be censured if he was at fault in dealing with these employees, whose punishment is meant to silence all opponents in the future because they will suffer the same fate, or perhaps a worse fate. Where are you, members of the Assembly, while all this is going on? Are we in a country of sleepers? Or are you afraid that your personal interests might not do well in the corridors of the ministries after seriously debating the ministers?

What comes to mind at this point is the passage of poetry by 'Ali al-Sabti:

Money talks in this city of mine
It buys, sells and rents mankind
Everything in my town has a price
From children to housing to sexual vice
No rain in the clouds and rock for land
Who are these people?
Simply man.

6945

CSO: 4404/193

SUPPORT FOR COUNTRY'S FOREIGN POLICY URGED

Kuwait AL-TALI'AH in Arabic No 723, 23 Dec 81 p 9

[Editorial: "Kuwaiti Foreign Policy; A Policy of Distinction, Not a Policy of Falling into Line"]

[Text] The visit begun by the Crown Prince and a number of ministers last Saturday bears the distinct imprint of Kuwaiti foreign policy, which must be supported in the present circumstances in the Arab world and the Gulf area. This visit seeks to bolster political solidarity and economic cooperation among the nations which he will visit.

The political aspect of the matter is important in a country such as Libya, which is clearly the subject of a number of American plots as the Reagan administration blatantly and openly seeks to bring down the Libyan government because it still gives a loud "No" to attempts by the United States to bring it to its knees, thanks to those Arab regimes which have spread flowers over their land in order to prepare to receive the American presence. First there was Egypt, then Oman, then who knows where. The Qadhdhafi government still rejects this. It is fighting it and it is fighting anyone who would turn the Arab people into mere numbers and cattle which cannot think for themselves and have no ability except to implement what others have decided.

The rationale for the visit to Libya fits into this context; it is the way the Kuwaiti people want to go and it must be reinforced at the official level. As in the case of the first visit to the countries of North Africa, the second visit to these countries, including Mauritania, also comes in this context. The peoples of these countries suffer from a great shortage of financial resources with which they might move ahead on economic development projects, despite the natural difficulties facing them. Any economic support for these countries would be considered genuine economic support in the Arab nationalist framework and this use of Arab funds would be considered proper and correct management. This is better than having these funds serve the interests of the United States in the form of deposits or weapons in the hands of these countries. Investing these funds with Arab hands will have an impact on these peoples who lack one of the means of production, i.e., capital.

We say that this is one of the outstanding characteristics of Kuwaiti foreign policy as explained by the Ruler's visit to the Balkan countries and as it is

now being explained by the Crown Prince's visit to the countries of North Africa and to Libya, especially in the current phase in which the Arab homeland is witnessing attempts to create blocs and divisions with financial pressures in order to implement what the Americans want from their puppets in the area. They attempt to plunder and they level all sorts of charges at anyone who tries to escape from these blocs, e.g., charges that he is against Arab unity now that the number of states joining ranks under the American umbrella has multiplied. This American umbrella plots against them and covers their national soil with American troops and their skies with aircraft which provide all kinds of information on what is going on in the area.

We believe that the correct policy is the one which the Kuwaiti Government is pursuing at the foreign policy level. It is just such an initiative which will be the means of implementing this policy.

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CSO: 4404/193

FRENCH WOMAN GIVEN LIFE SENTENCE FOR ESPIONAGE

NC211322 Paris AFP in English 1307 GMT 21 Feb 82

[Text] Valenciennes, northern France, 21 Feb (AFP)--A French widow and her two sons have been imprisoned for life by a Libyan court for alleged spying, the French consul in Tripoli said today.

The consul, contacted by telephone, said he was "floored" by the sentence on Denise Dupont, 58, and sons Alain, 25, and Jean-Claude, 21, who had already spent 22 months in a Libyan jail.

The consul said that an immediate appeal for clemency would be lodged with the Libyan authorities through diplomatic channels.

The last word with the Dupont's Libyan-appointed lawyer before the trial had made the French authorities believe that a light sentence was probable, perhaps no longer than the period the three had already spent in jail, the consul said.

For this reason the consulate had already booked tickets for the Duponts to fly home, the consul said.

It is still unclear what the family were doing in Libya when they were arrested in April 1980 on charges of "spying for American imperialism and Zionism." Mrs Dupont, who had been recently widowed, had gone to Algeria in 1979 with her sons, though neighbours in their home town near here described the family as "primitive" and said they had problems even catching a local bus.

In January 1980 the trio entered Libya on three-month tourist visas and were arrested in April after these expired. Consulate representatives--implicitly confirming the verdict of friends here that the family was mentally incapable of working for any foreign power--said that their physical and mental state had since deteriorated. Mrs Dupont and her eldest son were now in a psychiatric hospital, they said.

Their trial, postponed a dozen times without explanation, finally took place in camera on January 21. The Libyan press never reported the case and the verdict was delivered this morning to a half-empty courtroom.

In the Dupont's home town of Haulchin a defence committee has been set up and local mayors said today they were calling for a demonstration outside the Libyan Embassy in Paris.

CSO: 4500/106

BRIEFS

AL-'UBAYDI INTERVIEWED ON MIDEAST--Tripoli, 21 Feb (IRNA)--Revealing the expansionist policy of the United States in the region was one of the ways of confronting the U.S., according to 'Abd al-'Ati al-'Ubaydi, the Libyan foreign minister. Speaking to IRNA on Saturday the Libyan foreign minister said that the U.S. should be stopped from supporting the Zionist regime. The foreign minister also spoke on the establishment of an Islamic front, expressing his agreement on the suggestion saying that the Islamic countries with their unity could form a third force in the world. On the increase of Saudi oil exports, the Libyan foreign minister said that it damages all OPEC member countries and all OPEC members should get together and remind Saudi Arabia of its responsibilities. The foreign minister also praised the establishment of the Golan battalion at Iran's inception and said that Husayn of Jordan would do better to fight the Zionist regime than Muslims. The Golan battalion consists of Iraqi volunteer POWs and refugees which was formed after Iran's proposal and will be dispatched to Syria. The Iranian foreign minister, Dr. Velayati, recently visited Libya and held talks with his Libyan counterpart as part of the Iranian minister's tour of North African countries. [Text] [LD211142 Tehran IRNA in English 1024 GMT 21 Feb 82]

PATROL BOATS--Lorient, France, February 9--The first of ten fast patrol boats constructed by France for Libya has been handed over to its Libyan crew here, maritime sources said. The vessel, constructed by the naval shipyards in Cherbourg, Northern France, underwent sea trials off this Brittany port. It was delivered to its Libyan crew on Saturday, the sources said. Informed sources said that the craft would leave Lorient shortly for Libya. The ten vessels, similar to ships already delivered to or ordered by Iran, Israel, Greece, Nigeria and Argentina, are 49 meters long, displace 70 tons and are powered by four 4,500 horsepower diesel engines. They have a speed of about 40 knots (nautical miles per hour) and are equipped with four Otomat missiles, one 76 mm canon and twin 40 mm automatic weapons. (A.F.P.) [Text] [Paris AFRICA AFP in English No 2870, 9 Feb 82 p 14]

CSO: 4500/107

BOUCETTA DISCUSSES MOROCCAN FOREIGN POLICY

Rabat L'OPINION in French 15 Jan 82 pp 1, 3-4

[Interview with M'Hamed Boucetta, minister of state for foreign affairs, at the APE press luncheon in Paris, 14 Jan 1982]

[Text] M'Hamed Boucetta, minister of state for foreign affairs, was the guest Wednesday at a press luncheon organized by the Eurafrican Press Association in Paris for about 60 journalists representing all the French media (radio, television, newspapers and magazines) as well as many foreign correspondents accredited to the French capital.

After a laudatory introduction by Mr Max Jalade, president of the association, which traced M'Hamed Boucetta's career as a young lawyer, an Istiglal Party militant at the side of the late Allal el Fassi, and then a member of several administrations of his majesty the king as minister and minister of state, the open discussion between the minister of state and the journalists present began, centered on two basic themes: the question of the Middle East following the decision to adjourn the Arab Summit at Fez, and the conflict which persists in northwest Africa after the proposal made in Nairobi by his majesty King Hassan II to undertake a referendum in the Saharan provinces to be sponsored by the OAU.

Before replying to the journalists' questions, M'Hamed Boucetta made a preliminary statement, the complete text of which follows:

We are a country which finds itself in the midst of a number of problems due to our geographic location and our membership in certain groups. This situation gives us obligations. As Africans, we have important obligations to African institutions on the one hand, and to relationships which can unite us with certain groups or certain African countries, on the other.

Our Ambition: To Build A Maghreb Unity

Africa is currently going through an extremely important period from the point of view of her role in the world and the problems confronting her. Particularly in

the North African region, we have hopes and even ambitions of building an entity which will be able to respond to the real problems facing us, especially the problem of development. We have grown with this idea as individuals and we are set on achieving it, or at least launching it, because the Maghreb problem is of extreme importance to us.

Since we are an Arab country, you are certainly aware of our position on the problem of the Middle East, the role which Morocco plays. As I speak to you, we have a very great responsibility, even greater than in the past, even the recent past. We have, in the person of his majesty the king, the chairmanship of the Arab Summit which must find answers to basic questions on which not only the destiny of the Arab world, but perhaps even world peace, depend.

At this difficult time, we know that this responsibility is great, but Morocco and his majesty the king are set on playing their role fully. As a Muslim country, we also have responsibilities to Islam. The king of Morocco is also the president of the basic body of the Islamic Conference: the Al-Quds Committee which discusses the positions which the Islamic world should take in all areas, and particularly with regard to the problem of Palestine and the Middle East.

Our position, our situation and our recent history mean that our relationships with Europe must take on a certain character, especially those with France and Spain. We want these relationships, particularly those with France, to be favorable, not only in order to protect certain interests or even certain emotional aspects, but also because of necessity for our development on both the economic and cultural levels. We are also finding ourselves both geographically and strategically at a point which obliges us to take certain positions.

On a general basis, my country--I will not say that it can serve as an example to Third World countries--is perhaps not a living ideal of democracy, but is approaching it as closely as it can. We have a system which we feel to be valid and also perfectible; our Constitution allows political groups, and not just a single party, to express themselves, to have quite a bit of freedom. I am not saying total freedom, we are not living in an ideal democracy, but there is freedom of expression, the right to assembly, the freedom to organize unions. There are representative organizations on the local, regional and national levels which permit expression of the people's will and their ideas, the making of choices necessary for the nation and the exercise of a certain amount of control over the executive branch.

We chose a constitutional monarchy which has lasted here for several centuries and within its framework the Moroccan people have been flourishing and trying to defend freedom. In comparison to the Third World we find ourselves in a good enough position to say that, on this level, we are on the right track. Of course we have basic problems, the largest of which is our economic development. We are trying to face the problems which it poses for us and to find the best solutions.

We are also confronted with the situation of tension in the Maghreb region because we have tried to recover our sovereignty over certain territories which we lost due to colonization and strife. Our country has this characteristic peculiar to African countries that it was not colonized all at one time or all by a single power.

Colonization and Decolonization in Stages

In fact, the colonization of Morocco stretched over a period of more than 50 years. We were colonized bit by bit from 1860 to 1912. Each of these bits was subject to different colonial status: protectorate, colony, status related to a protectorate, etc.

During decolonization, the same phenomenon recurred and we were thus decolonized bit by bit: In 1956 first the French protectorate treaty was abrogated, and then the Spanish; in 1958, Tarfaya was recovered; in 1957, the Tangier zone, which had been under the administration of 13 powers, including what was Russia at the time as well as the United States; in 1969, Ifni was recovered and 7 years later, the Western Sahara which is the source of the current tension.

As far as we are concerned, we have definitely decided to defend our territorial integrity and also to build Maghreb in peace and serenity. Our relationships with our Algerian, Mauritanian and Malian neighbors are absolutely essential to development. We are trying to do everything possible to make these relationships the best. Our relationships with Europe, particularly with France and Spain, must also be favorable.

We will continue to develop them with the utmost goodwill and determination despite the difficult times caused by poor interpretations of certain positions or even by certain stands which may seem difficult for us to accept.

[Question] (JEUNE AFRIQUE) What is the status of the contacts between Morocco and Algeria?

[Answer] There has been public, official contact marked by a certain solemnity. I must say that the reason for the contact was not the matter of the Sahara or bilateral relations. I was asked by his majesty the king to go in person to Algiers to bring a message to President Chadli Bendjedid confirming the invitation to participate in the Arab Summit. I must add that I received an excellent welcome in Algiers and that I spent close to 1 1/2 hours with the president.

I must say that we discussed not only general affairs and the Arab Summit, but that we also spoke of regional matters, of future cooperation between Morocco and Algeria, of the building of Maghreb and of the tension which exists in the area. These same themes were also the subjects of discussion with the Algerian minister of foreign affairs when he was in Fez--where I believe he was appropriately received--and he had rather lengthy and fruitful discussions with his majesty the king on these questions.

I feel that--this is a summary of these discussions--since the Algerians have said that they were defending the principle of self-determination of the people--a principle which they defend several thousand kilometers from their borders--they could therefore not fail to defend it on their own borders. Fine. With this principle established and accepted by Morocco and the problem in the hands of the OAU, it must therefore turn out that there are no more reasons to maintain this tension at the level where it has been. And that, consequently, we feel that as the OAU must do its job, relations should return to normal. This is the status of the Algerian question.

Moroccan Identity Already Confirmed by the Ijma'

[Question] (LE FIGARO) Mr Minister, in the current state of affairs, can you tell us whether the referendum on the Sahara or in the Sahara will take place before or after the OAU Summit?

[Answer] We hope that it will take place before. We hope this very much.

[Question] (TOP-AFRICA) Why, at the time of the Green March, when there was unanimous support behind Morocco, didn't Morocco bring up the question of a referendum which would have been a complete success?

[Answer] But we did, Madame. Right at the beginning. In other words, the Spanish left on 28 February 1975, and on the 26th this expression of the will of the people took place through the Ijma'. It is necessary to describe what is involved. We are in a very attractive Paris office speaking about a referendum. It involves 266,000 square kilometers with 74,000 inhabitants: children, women, people of all ages. To have a referendum--we are not in an area equipped with roads, telephones, etc. where it is easy to assemble people around a table for a poll.

There was an organization which represented all the peoples and tribes who lived there and which expressed their opinions. It expressed itself by saying: "I confirm my Moroccan identity." It was an assembly of 101 people, 89 or 90 of whom were present. Consequently....

[Question] All the more reason. Why wouldn't this be possible now? The conditions have not changed.

[Answer] There is dispute. Aggression has continued. Many countries (Arab, African and even European, such as France, England, Italy) have addressed Morocco, saying: "To cut short any dispute, and since you are so sure of what you are doing anyway, why won't you agree to a referendum?" We have done a lot of thinking. It has posed many problems for us. I assure you that without the king himself and the unanimous support around him, it would have been very difficult for any of us, whether in charge of a political party, no matter what its size, or head of a government, no matter what its strength, the king himself would have been needed to say: "Alright, I agree to a confirmation of this will." You know what follows.

Despite everything, problems have been created in Morocco, not only among certain opposition parties, but even among the people of the Sahara who have said to themselves: "Why are you casting doubt on our Moroccan identity by agreeing to have a referendum?"

[Question] (REUTER) But who is going to vote, Mr Minister? How will the votes be counted? This is an important question.

[Answer] There, fortunately, chance has taken care of things. Before the Spanish left the territory, and they previously did this for all the colonies, they took a census. And the last count was taken by Spain precisely in the 1974 period. It gives the exact status of the population, its size, with all the elements which comprise it. For each individual, his name, his father's name, his grandfather's name, his age, place of birth, level of education. Therefore, it is verifiable.

[Question] Are these the 14,000 which you mentioned?

[Answer] No. There were people who were obliged to leave the area at a given time. In other words, there were some who went to Tarfaya and Tan-Tan, others who went to Algeria, others to Mauritania. A total of around 30,000. Therefore, we are at around 100 to 110,000.

[Question] (AFP) On the domestic level, in regard to the arrest of Bouabid and certain USFP [Socialist Union of Popular Forces] activists, what is their current status? Were they arrested because of the riots or because they opposed the referendum?

[Answer] No, this had nothing to do with the Casablanca riots, which have been blown out of proportion anyway. It was in regard to rather violent criticism which could have had much more serious repercussions, especially when the country finds itself in a situation like the one in which Morocco now does, in regard to army morale and to a population which is very sensitive on an extremely important question, to say that there were random arrangements made on the part of the king and the government.

In this regard, I would especially like to say here that the sensitivity on this question in Morocco is of extreme importance and that this could trigger a very serious situation. And that, consequently, it is necessary to be very prudent with this question. That is the problem.

[Question] (EURAFRICAN PRESS ASSOCIATION) Mr Minister, has it been decided yet whether the king of Morocco will or will not go to the next OAU summit which will be held in Libya?

[Question] (AFP) And what is the status of relations between Morocco and Libya?

A Probationary Period for Libya

[Answer] First of all there is a meeting which is supposed to be held shortly--that I announced a few minutes ago--in Nairobi, which his majesty will very certainly attend (at the end of January). As far as Tripoli is concerned, I don't know yet what decision will be made because there is still agitation throughout Africa as to whether the summit will take place or not.

As far as we are concerned, we have not yet changed our position. We said that this summit would be held in Tripoli, therefore we will participate. But I feel that there is already hesitation and reserve. What was decided in Nairobi on holding the summit in Tripoli was to first have a "probationary period" to see how the Libyan regime would behave in regard to the other African countries. I am still asking myself questions about the Ghana problem now. What will Africa's reaction be?

[Question] (FRANCE-EUROPE-OUTRE MER) Why do you speak about Ghana in connection with Libya?

[Answer] Because everyone knows that a Libyan delegation has just arrived in Ghana and everyone has learned through press dispatches that there were contacts by

Libya to prepare for what has just happened in Ghana. I am not telling you everything. You're the ones who told me.

[Question] (AFP) And, for Morocco, what will be the determining factor in regard to Libya?

[Answer] Libya has taken an initiative in regard to Morocco: to resume relations in order to facilitate the solution of certain problems which are as much African as Arab. We saw that this initiative would have positive results for us as Moroccans and as an African country. We also saw that this could help to reconcile some points of view in the Arab world. I cannot prejudge Libya's response to such and such a problem involving us, but as of now we are maintaining relations and seeing how Libya will act.

[Question] (AFP) But,--more concretely--has Libya ceased its assistance to the POLISARIO Front?

[Answer] Officially, yes. That's what we are told. But unofficially, I must say that we are continuing to seize Libyan weapons on the field. Were they given to them before the resumption of Moroccan-Libyan relations or afterwards--we shall see.

Complete Control of the Territory

[Question] (AFP) So, Morocco's participation in the Tripoli Summit will depend on Libya's behavior with regard to the POLISARIO Front?

[Answer] And on other questions in Africa also--and mainly on the POLISARIO Front --of course.

[Question] (RTL) One has the impression that when the POLISARIO Front attacks it always has the advantage, even when you sometimes succeed in winning the battle. How does this happen?

[Answer] That's very obvious. We are not the aggressors. Therefore we have to wait to be attacked here or there. Consequently, it is the aggressor who chooses the place and the time. So he has the initial advantage. But, it is an advantage which is wiped out immediately afterward, that I can confirm to you in all spheres. As far as the territory is concerned, we have had to make arrangements on the military level, therefore on the strategic level, for deployment or regrouping of forces, their installation, their mobility, etc. And I can tell you that we control the entire territory. In regard to Guelta Zemmour and Bir Anzaran.

[Question] (JEUNE AFRIQUE) It is a tactical retreat?

[Answer] I can say yes. There are military measures taken with whose details I am not acquainted, but I can confirm that we control and are masters of all of the territory.

[Question] (AFP) You have had discussions regarding an increase in American military assistance. Has it been achieved?

[Answer] Yes. There are weapons which we have acquired from the Americans, which we buy to defend territory--defensive weapons--with the commitment, moreover, that these weapons from the United States or elsewhere will never be used in aggression against someone else.

[Question] (AFP) And, American military advisers?

[Answer] No. We have no troops, no advisers, nothing.

[Question] (EUROPE-1) Mr Minister, do you agree with the LE MONDE analysis, made in an editorial yesterday or the day before incidentally, of the development of French policy toward Algeria and--to quote--"to the detriment of Morocco"?

[Answer] I believe that it is difficult to say "to the detriment of Morocco" because there is nevertheless an understanding, an in-depth examination of problems and mutual interests which neither the French nor the Moroccan officials must be unaware of. France says officially and clearly--and we acknowledge it as a reality--that she wants to maintain a certain neutrality on the Sahara question. That is fair. We acknowledge it.

France wants to have a role in relationship to North Africa--a completely legitimate, completely natural role in view of the relationships which have always existed between France and North Africa. She wants to do this at a time when relations between the North African partners themselves are not completely normal and good. But we hope that France will always be able to play this role of peacemaker first of all, and then we feel that relations between the Maghreb and France will always be much more useful and more significant than the relations between each of these countries and France.

[Question] (MAP) Mr Minister, do you have any indications on the next official visit that his majesty will make to the United States?

[Answer] Yes. Provisionally, it should be within the next few weeks. It is supposed to be set for March or April. But there are no very specific indications yet.

[Question] (EFE) What assessment can Morocco make of the war in the Western Sahara from the beginning; what are the losses of men and equipment, and what advantages have you obtained? Do you see an end to the war?

[Answer] To us Moroccans, the tension which exists in the area is completely unjustified. Basically, we know that it is a Moroccan territory which was occupied by Spain for a certain period. When the Moroccan claim to the territory was initiated, Morocco was the only country in the area to claim the territory and this was natural, because it was its territory. When the stage of recovering the area was entered into, there was unanimous agreement at the Arab Summit in Rabat in which Algeria participated, represented by the late President Houari Boumedienne.

Algeria made it very clear there that it was indeed a Moroccan territory to which she had no claim. In its decolonization, her basic concerns were that there would be no disagreement with Mauritania and that there would be no war with Spain, because the threat would be located on her borders. That could threaten her security.

A Referendum for Confirmation, Complying With Africa's Wishes

Once these two items were assured, however, we were surprised to see first of all the creation of a so-called liberation movement called "POLISARIO" and then the continuation of aggression against Morocco. The problem developed on the political and diplomatic scale to the point where the decision was made in Nairobi to proceed with a referendum which we ourselves submitted for the consideration of our African peers.

At the beginning it started with a massive introduction of Algerian troops into this territory. Let us not forget what happened in February 1976 when the Moroccan Army was holding more than 3,500 Algerian soldiers in this territory, and particularly in Amgala, and that it was upon the very influential intervention of many Arab countries that we gave in and let the soldiers return home.

Unfortunately, there was a relapse 1 month later when they sent some other soldiers, 120 of which we captured and who are still in Rabat, soldiers belonging to Algerian National Army units--I am not speaking of "POLISARIO" forces, these were soldiers registered in regular Algerian Army units.

Since then, some Western Saharans have been obliged, and I do mean obliged, to evacuate the Sahara and to locate themselves in Tindout where an entire movement has been established and subsequently inflated with Malians, Nigerians and Mauritians, or with Touaregs who have been pushed by natural phenomena such as drought.

There is aggression against Morocco from time to time, but I wouldn't be able to give you a detailed count. I know that it has cost dozens of human lives, I could even say several hundred human lives in the Royal Armed Forces and thousands on the other side. Which is lamentable for both sides. But this will not change the basic facts at all.

Morocco has ended up by complying with the wishes of Africa and of many other countries outside of the continent who wanted to be assured that the people of these regions were indeed Moroccan and that that was their desire. We have said that they had indeed expressed this desire on several occasions, first of all through the Ijma', the body empowered for this purpose, and then through the elections in which they participated in varying degrees whether it be on the local, professional or national level, or by actually living in the territory at present. Despite all this, in order to reconfirm the expression of this desire, Morocco proposed in Nairobi during the OAU meeting, through his majesty the king, that this referendum take place as quickly as possible.

Boumedienne's Three Mistakes

[Question] (REUTERS) Why has there been this reversal in Algeria's position? And why wasn't Boumedienne's speech approving the division of the Sahara between Morocco and Mauritania made public?

[Answer] It was not up to us to publicize this speech, it was up to the Arab League to do it. When it was needed, 1 year later, the Arab League was asked to publicize it directly.

Why the reversal? It would have been more appropriate to pose the question to our Algerian friends, but I believe that there was an error of evaluation in Algerian policy. I have asked the question of myself several times; even before joining the government in 1977 as a representative of a political party, I asked myself why Algeria had changed her position.

Three basic errors were committed in the Algerian's policy evaluations:

(1) The situation in Morocco being what it was, with most of the political parties belonging to the opposition, Algeria said: "the Moroccan Government would never attack Algeria since," and I must agree, in 1963 certain opposition parties were not in agreement on the border war.

The Algerians said to themselves, the current government would never attack the Sahara or Algeria, that would be against the administration, perhaps it could even go farther. Which was a basic error since there was unanimous support around the king when he decided to make the claim an immediate material recovery and no longer just a political claim. The king had unanimous support, it was therefore a false evaluation.

(2) Given our past relations with Mauritania, the Algerians said to themselves, Mauritania will never come to agreement with Morocco, therefore we can play one against the other. Which also proved to be a basic error because in November 1975 an agreement was made just with the Mauriticians.

(3) With Spain in the situation she was in at the time and the Algerians, it must be recalled that the Conference of the Non-Aligned Nations had just been held in Algiers. Algeria said, Spain will never come to an agreement with Morocco without going through us, since we are Spain's entry to the Third World, and to the Arab world.

Besides these three basic errors, there were other internal Algerian problems which unfortunately placed us in this situation which we hope to correct shortly.

Referendum: Moroccan Army and Administration Present

[Question] (AFP) The second question I would like to ask concerns the Saharan conflict. There was a resolution adopted at the OAU Summit in Nairobi. Six months later, one has the impression that nothing has happened, that it exists on paper but that there has been no meeting of the committee which was planned. What is the status, on the practical level, of the implementation of this resolution?

[Answer] The committee met after the summit and took certain steps, and it gave its president the responsibility of contacting the UN to find out what assistance could be given to the OAU in carrying out the referendum. You know that the period the UN has just passed through has been above all devoted to the election of a secretary general. Once the new secretary general was elected, they began to work. A meeting is planned for the end of January, probably in Nairobi, within the next 2 weeks.

[Question] (EUROPE-FRANCE-OUTRE MER) Regarding the interpretation of the OAU resolutions on the referendum, I would like to know how the role of the Moroccan Army and administration is interpreted?

Furthermore, the king participated in the Council on Saharan Affairs in the month of August. Has it already met? Within the Moroccan framework, aren't they moving toward autonomy for these peoples?

[Answer] On the first point, I believe things have been quite clear, not only through the silence on certain points, but also due to the fact that they were mentioned and discussed and solutions were found.

Three problems were brought up in Nairobi, at the Summit as well as before the committee of seven. Finding out whether the Moroccan Army would remain in the territory was not a problem which was forgotten or neglected. It was decided that the troops will remain.

Second, the Moroccan administration. Neither was this problem forgotten or neglected. It was dealt with. The decision was made that the administration will stay. This took place on 29 August 1981 to be exact, in Nairobi at the committee meeting.

Third, must there be direct negotiations between Morocco and the POLISARIO Front? These are the three basic problems which were discussed and upon which Africa has decided.

Consequently, since what remain are the methods, Morocco is completely ready and has contributed all its aid and assistance, and all its means so that the referendum may take place as quickly as possible. That is our position.

Nations in the Region the Only Spokesmen

[Question] (AFP) What has Africa decided on direct negotiations?

[Answer] The POLISARIO Front has never been considered a liberation movement (it is not even recognized on the list of African liberation movements). The SDAR [Saharan Democratic Arab Republic] state has not been recognized. Therefore, the negotiator can only be the countries in the region, one with the other. If there is any negotiation, it will take place between Morocco and Algeria, Morocco and Mauritania, and so on, through the intermediary of the OAU.

The Sahara region itself and its integration within Morocco needs to be known, examined more in depth. And the Council will have to study its particular features. Furthermore, the king clarified it in his introductory speech by saying that there were certain traditions, certain customs which must be brought into conformity or harmony with other legal stipulations or other Moroccan customs.

Consequently, this is the purpose of this committee. I must also say that this committee will have an important role to play in renewing the expression of the people's will. This also means that perhaps as has happened in certain other areas of Morocco, some economic/social structures can be established in this region. This does not affect either Morocco's sovereignty or the territories' membership in it at all.

[Question] Why haven't you taken advantage of this trip to meet with Mr Cheysson?

[Answer] That could have been done, of course. I will certainly telephone him to greet him. It happens that I am in Paris for reasons other than to see Mr Cheysson, but we are in touch by telephone or on all occasions which have presented themselves.

[Question] (REUTERS) A few minutes ago you mentioned favorable relations with France. In regard to the Sahara, do you feel that these relations continue to be favorable? What does Morocco think of the fact that the French minister of foreign affairs has authorized the establishment of the POLISARIO office in Paris?

[Answer] We had many apprehensions when the change occurred in France, given the attitude of the Socialist Party as a member party of the Socialist Internationale which has rushed to take positions without examining them in much depth, positions far from the truth and positions of principle that it had to take. With the coming to power of the Socialist Party in France, there were two important items: The first is perhaps a more responsible examination of the question as a government and no longer as the party.

This has enabled the establishment of certain positions which are much more acceptable than they were when the Socialist Party expressed its opinion within the Internationale. Secondly, thanks to the initiative of his majesty the king, there has been Morocco's agreement to proceed with a referendum in the Sahara, which also corresponds to what the Socialists claim to defend: the principle of the referendum, the principle of expression of the people's will. These two things have made the current position one which is completely in the right direction, in other words, first of all a certain neutrality and then support for this initiative to have Africa handle the question.

France repeats that in African problems such as this one, it will adopt the decisions made by the OAU. And I believe that this is the position of the French Government at present.

[Question] (RTL) Since the failure of the Fez Summit there seems to be a definite desire on the part of all the Arab countries to "mend broken fences." Can we expect a summit very shortly, or at least before 25 April, date of the Sinai withdrawal and perhaps the burial of Camp David, as some diplomats have already said?

[Answer] I must tell you that the Fez Summit did not end in failure. In the context of the Arab world, the Fez Summit's best solution was the one taken. Therefore, as far as the Arab world is concerned, it is a success and not a failure. Why? Instead of the Arab world presenting itself before international opinion as divided, it is taking time for consideration on the one hand, and on the other hand is deciding to resolve basic problems. Consequently, we feel, and this, moreover, has been recognized recently by certain Arab officials that the world would consider the ones chiefly responsible for the adjournment--here I mean my friend 'Abd al-Halim Khaddam, Syria's minister of foreign affairs and the statements he made to AL CHARQ AL AWSAT--that the summit will certainly reconvene within the period planned at the beginning. Bilateral contact must be made between several Arab countries. This has already begun. I myself was in Riyadh 4 or 5 days ago, representing the king of Morocco as well as the secretary general of the Arab League, to discuss with the Saudi officials the cooperation required in this regard.

It is necessary to proceed with some discussions among other countries before this summit, which will be preceded by the meeting of the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs which will definitely be held at the end of April or beginning of May. Regarding the related problem that you mentioned, and which is important, the problem of Egypt, we do not need to repeat that Egypt is an essential part of the Arab world, essential for peace or war in the Middle East.

If the Arab world has set Egypt aside a bit from the political point of view, it is because Egypt is an essential part of the Arab world, essential to peace or war in the Middle East.

If the Arab world has set Egypt aside a bit from the political point of view, it is because Egypt has not respected the commitments made in the Arab world, i.e. that the search for a solution to the problem of the Middle East must not result in a partial solution involving a single country, but must be an overall solution. Insofar as we can have Egypt in the Arab ranks, it will thus present the Arab world with much more strength and a much better opportunity to solve this problem. Which we will not disregard.

[Question] (AFP) Have contacts been made, or will they be, to have Egypt participate in the next meeting of Arab ministers and will you still make the "death" of the Camp David agreements a condition? Does this mean that for Egypt the Camp David agreements are officially no longer valid?

[Answer] I have said that Egypt is of extreme importance to peace or war in the Middle East. I confirm this. Important due to its contribution to the Arab world, its population, its strategic and geographical location. Of course. Also because it is the country in confrontation with Israel. Having said this, there are no official contacts due to the decision made in Baghdad to break off relations with Egypt until she denounces the Camp David agreements.

This does not mean that if Egypt takes a clear stand on this question and on the problems confronting her, there will not be a resumption of relations with Egypt.

As far as Morocco is concerned, I am only going to remind you of two events. When Israel made the decision in the Knesset to consider Jerusalem its "indivisible and permanent" capital--and the latter is located in the Islamic quarter--there was an initiative on the part of his majesty the king of Morocco as president of the Al-Quds Committee and, at the time, as president of the entire Islamic Conference, to make an appeal to Egypt to take a clear stand vis-a-vis Israel in regard to the Jerusalem problem.

Another initiative was made, this time on the Arab level, when the Iraqi nuclear power plant at Tammuz was bombed, to again call on Egypt to rejoin the Arab ranks and therefore to denounce its agreements with Israel. Thus, the search for any rapprochement with Egypt will take place.

[Question] (AF) Are there any unofficial contacts? You spoke of official contact.

[Answer] Unofficial contacts are not reported to the press because they are unofficial.

[Question] (FRENCH-ARAB ASSOCIATION FOR SOLIDARITY) Mr Minister, what is your feeling on the prospective trip by Mr Mitterrand, the French president, to Israel, and do you believe that it can serve peace in the Middle East?

[Answer] I believe that faced with the positions currently held by Israel, its arrogance and its continuation to take such decisive positions not only on the formal and political level, but also through continuous aggression and violations of international law, the Arabs will find this very difficult to interpret, as Israel is always encouraged.

The Golan affair has come up again, showing that all the diplomatic actions, all the approaches made to Israel in search of peace, only encourage her to continue to violate international law. And, there are questions currently being raised in the Arab world. You know that the Security Council met on the Golan affair but that this poses very painful problems for our relations with the rest of the world.

[Question] I would like to have your feelings on the French position on the Middle East, because the French are trying to play both sides. They use language which pleases the Israelis when they go there. When they are with the Arabs, then they speak of the Palestinians and the PLO. Don't you think that they have an ambiguous and vague position which will result in nothing?

[Answer] We ask ourselves some questions from time to time. France must have a clear position on these big problems; when we get to the bottom in discussions with French officials. Besides, I have had the opportunity to have lengthy discussions with Mr Cheysson. In most cases we have discovered widely divergent positions, especially in regard to recognizing the PLO as a prerequisite to any future negotiations.

We are perhaps not in agreement on what interpretation to give the effects of the Camp David agreements or relations with Egypt, but overall, and particularly after the Venice declaration and its confirmation by the new French leaders, we have felt that a reasonable solution was being more closely approached. It was not the Arab solution, but it came close to it. The Arab world attaches great importance to French positions and to the role that France must play in seeking a solution in the Middle East, given its past influence, its influence as a world power, and the importance it assigns to the matter of Lebanon, an extremely important part of this question, and we hope that France will play this role fully without being too ambiguous.

In concluding his discussion with the APE journalists, Minister M'Hamed Boucetta invited them to come to the African countries to hold this type of meeting, and thus meet with several people at once.

The minister of state for foreign affairs hoped that Morocco would be the host for the association next fall.

Minister M'Haned Boucetta was accompanied at the press luncheon by Mr Moulay Ahmed Drissi, ambassador, director of the press and information division at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Mr Ma El-Ainine of his staff; Mr Abdelkader Eljay, minister-adviser to the Moroccan Embassy in Paris; as well as Messrs Abderrazak Jaidi, Saad Baddou and Cherti, press adviser, political adviser and economic adviser to the Moroccan Embassy in Paris, respectively.

PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF YEMEN

BRIEFS

SOVIET GEOLOGY MINISTER ARRIVES--Comrade Yevgeniy Kozlovskiy, candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee and Soviet minister of geology, arrived in Aden this morning at the head of a high-level delegation for an official visit to Democratic Yemen lasting several days. In a statement to the Aden News Agency on his arrival, Kozlovskiy said the purpose of the delegation's visit is to consolidate the bonds of friendship and cooperation existing between the two friendly countries and peoples as well as the cooperation in the geological field which has been developing for a long time. [Text] [EA250212 Aden Domestic Service in Arabic 1630 GMT 24 Feb 82 EA]

CSO: 4404/297

RIYADH TELEVISION INTERVIEWS SAUDI INTERIOR MINISTER

GF210514 Riyadh Domestic Television Service in Arabic 1800 GMT 20 Feb 82

[Interview granted by Saudi Minister Nayif ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz to Television Correspondent--recorded]

[Excerpts] [Question] [Words indistinct] Arab interior minister and the rest of them will arrive tomorrow, God willing, to attend the emergency conference to be held on Monday. Will Your Highness cast light on the purpose of holding that conference?

[Answer] The conference on Monday will confirm the statute of the Arab Interior Ministers Council--just that--because, as is known, the Arab Interior Ministers Conference held in at-Ta'if last year decided to change the conferences of interior ministers into a Council of Interior Ministers, as is the case in certain councils of the Arab League. Since then, a group was assigned under the supervision of the Arab League to draft a statute for the Interior Ministers Council. When this project was fulfilled, it was reviewed by the Arab interior ministers. Hence this emergency conference was scheduled in order to discuss and ratify the statute.

The date for this conference was chosen for a particular reason. After ratification of this statute by the interior ministers, the statute will be presented to the Permanent Council of the Arab League for final ratification and legalization.

As for the reason of holding the conference of Arab interior ministers here, it is because the Arab League Council will meet in March 1982 to ratify the statute and hold the first meeting of the Arab Interior Ministers Council in Morocco in September 1982. This conference is being held in Saudi Arabia because Saudi Arabia was the site of the previous conference last year. Therefore, the rule applied here is that the country chairing the previous conference should chair the present conference since the next conference will be held in another country.

[Question] Of course, this conference will be attended by the GCC interior ministers. Since they will meet with their fraternal interior ministers of other Arab countries, will there be further security coordination between the Gulf countries and other Arab countries?

[Answer] Actually, this rapprochement will take place. The GCC secretariat general called for a meeting of the GCC interior ministers which was scheduled to be held after the conclusion of the Arab interior ministers conference since the GCC interior ministers will attend that conference here. The GCC conference will begin Tuesday following the Arab interior ministers conference.

Of course, this will complement meetings held every now and then among GCC ministers in all fields. No doubt, the security issue is that most important aspect in the Gulf countries and a complement of all these meetings. Of course, God willing, the conference will bring about good results which are to be considered complementary to previous meetings and contacts among the GCC countries.

CSO: 4404/297

SAUDI PAPER ON U.S.-SAUDI COMMITTEE

GF211204 Jidda AL-BILAD in Arabic 16 Feb 82 p 1

[Untitled Editorial]

[Text] Those who are trying to spread doubts about the Saudi role in maintaining peace and security in this region and in the world in general know well that they are moving in a vicious circle full of mist and illusion. In this effort they are trying to harm one of the wisest, most balanced and expressive policies in the world.

Those who look at facts as if they were their sick illusions and try to change true images into false pictures do not realize that history can be cruel for it registers everything and forgets nothing. The issue has become a matter of time.

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia--people and leadership--is anxious to play a clear role on the Arab, Islamic and international levels in order to reinforce Arab and Islamic capabilities and confront all challenges.

As a political and economic power which has Arab and international influence, Saudi Arabia has the right to develop its power, improve its military techniques, and have the capability to enable it to confront any challenge at this age in which power plays a role in changing the world map. Therefore, Saudi Arabia has clear interests that agree with its basic religious beliefs and a strategy based on Arab solidarity and avoiding interference in others' affairs. That is why the U.S.-Saudi Joint Committee came into being as one of the influential factors on which Saudi Arabia counts, not in directing its policy, but in supervising and following up Saudi purchases and military projects with the United States. This is a normal matter that is not worthy of comment. However, those who play with fire and wear masks according to the seasons try to distort any fact that represents this holy and good country.

The truth is realized by the whole world, and the Saudi role is too big and comprehensive to be harmed by deviating parties and in such a mean way.

CSO: 4404/297

SAUDI ARABIA

SAUDI ARABIA SIGNS OIL AGREEMENT WITH SOMALIA

LD201436 Riyadh SPA in Arabic 1405 GMT 20 Feb 82

[Text] Jidda: 20 Feb (SPA)--An agreement on oil cooperation was signed in Riyadh today between the Kingdom and Somalia according to which the Kingdom will supply Somalia with about 360,000 tons of crude oil worth \$125 million. The agreement was signed on behalf of the Kingdom by the Minister of Telegraph, Post and Telephones and Acting Oil Minister Dr Alawi Darwish Kayyal, and on behalf of Somalia by the Finance Minister Abdullahi Addu.

Following the signing the Somalia finance minister expressed his happiness at this step which will help a great deal in solving Somalia's economic problems. In a statement to SPA he said that the government of His Majesty King Khalid and the Crown Prince are eager to help Somalia and render it to vital economic assistance. Dr Kayyal said that the Kingdom in helping its Muslim brothers is guided by its belief and Islamic conviction. He added that the Saudi government has met the cost of this quantity of crude oil for Somalia and that the ministry of finance and national economy has paid the cost to the monetary establishment out of its solidarity with the circumstances in Somalia.

CSO: 4404/297

BRIEFS

DAIRY PROJECT--Khartoum, Jan 30 (SUNA)--The Board of the Arab-Sudanese Company for Dairy Products has contracted the Danish company of "Turn Key" to build the dairy factory the company is establishing at Simeir area, north of Gezira. The Board of the Arab-Sudanese Company for Dairy Products toured last week the factories being implemented by the Danish firm in Riyadh and Jedda, Saudi Arabia. The membership of the company's board includes Saudi Arabia, Kuwaiti and Iran and is chaired by Under-Secretary of Finance and Economic Planning, Dr. Sayed Ali Zaki. [Text] [Khartoum SUNA DAILY BULLETIN in English 30 Jan 82 pp 2-3]

BAN LIFTED ON SAUDI PAPER--Khartoum, Feb 11 (SUNA)--Saudi Arabian daily AS SHARQ AL AWSAT has been allowed re-entry into Sudan after its publishers have apologized for publishing items that prompted ban of distribution of the newspaper in Sudan last week. Attorney-General Hassar Al Turaby, on consultation with the authorities concerned yesterday ordered lifting of ban on distribution of the daily in Sudan. The newspaper publishers in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, contacted Internal Affairs State Minister Mohamed Osman Abu Saq, apologized for publishing those items and requested re-distribution of their newspaper in Sudan. The publishers have stressed that their newspaper harbours no hostile attitude towards Sudan and that Sudanese officials are welcome to publish anything they want on that newspaper. The Sudanese officials have made it clear to the publishers that freedom is fully guaranteed for both local and foreign press and that they are absolutely willing to offer all accurate information the press asks for. [Text] [Khartoum SUNA DAILY BULLETIN in English 11 Feb 82 p 1]

JOINT BANK WITH INDIA--Khartoum, Feb 9 (SUNA)--The final steps regarding the establishment of a joint bank between the Emirates and Sudan investment Company and the Indian State Bank have been finalized, a reliable source stated. The board chairman of the Emirate and Sudan Investment Company and its Director General were back here recently from India after conducting talks with officials of the Indian Bank in this regard. A senior official of the Indian State Bank is due here shortly to be acquainted with implementation steps of the joint bank which would contribute to the development of Sudan's economy. The company contributes 50% to the \$20 million capital of the Bank while the Indian Bank will provide 40% the remaining 10% of the bank's capital will be sold to other parties. [Text] [Khartoum SUNA DAILY BULLETIN in English 9 Feb 82 p 4]

SAUDI PAPER BANNED--Khartoum, February 3--Sudan has banned a Saudi Arabian paper, accusing it of fabricating news against the country and of abusing the Sudanese people, the official Sudan News Agency (SUNA) reported here Tuesday night. The newspaper is the Arabic-language daily AL SHARQ AL-AWSAT. Quoting an authoritative source, SUNA said the paper had insulted the Sudanese people by printing a cartoon which depicted them as "idiots who do not know the Arabic language." The paper "continued to embrace some people who are known for their hostility to Sudan," and adopted a line which affected Sudanese relations with the Saudi people, the source was quoted as saying. (A.F.P.) [Paris AFRICA AFP in English No 2869, 5 Feb 82 p 15]

OFFICIAL COMMENTS ON OAU MEETING--Khartoum, 3 Mar (SUNA)--Chairman of the central affairs committee at the Sudanese People's Assembly Malik Husayn Hamid commented on the withdrawal of 19 countries from the OAU Ministerial Council meetings in Addis Ababa in protest against the presence of the Arab Republic Sahara. He said the executive body of the OAU has overlooked some resolutions taken by the organization's Freeton summit in 1980 and Nairobi summit in 1981. He said the Addis Ababa crisis is disappointing and evokes doubts over the future of the OAU and its ability to deal with future problems of the African continent. While other nations are coming closer to each other for the sake of their mutual interests the Africans are doing the opposite, he added. He voiced his support of the efforts of the Sudan to achieve solidarity among African countries. [Text] [JN032146 Khartoum SUNA in English 1745 GMT 3 Mar 82]

CSO: 4500/111

MINISTERS DISCUSS COUNTRY'S OIL POTENTIAL, ECONOMIC FUTURE

Beirut AL-IQTISAD WA AL-A'MAL in Arabic No 32, Nov 81 pp 39-50

[Interviews with Mansour Moalla, minister of finance and planning, and Abdelaziz Lasram, minister of national economy; "Moalla and Lasram: Tunisia's Economic Experiment"; Tunisian minister of economy to AL-IQTISAD WA AL-A' MAL: "Ramifications of Expanded ECC: Possibilities of Continued Economic Recession Are Problem With Larger Consequences Than Accession of New Countries"; Tunisian minister of finance and planning to AL-IQTISAD WA AL-A' MAL: "\$16 Billion in Investments, Real Annual Growth of 6.8 Percent, 280,000 New Work Opportunities, 65 Percent of Spending for Production Sector, and We Are Seeking To Raise Arab Share in Financing This Growth to 50 Percent (Compared to 20 Percent in Fifth Plan); Emphasis on Agriculture and on Industries Requiring no Large Capital; Gradual Reduction of Balance of Trade Deficit; Arab Investment in Tunisia: Control of Power by Tunisians Dictates That Arab Investor Be Protected by Legislation and Be Given Rights in Return for His Commitments; Arab Investment in Agriculture Faces Two Problems: Unpermissibility of Ownership of Land by Non-Tunisians and Ban on Joint Stock Companies in Agriculture; Banking Financial Structure: We Have Raised Interest on Savings From 7.5 to 9.5 Percent But Financial Market Needs To Develop Its Activity and Its Institutions; Social Peace: Public Interest Dictates Adherence to Rules of Settlement of Disputes; Leadership Is Primarily Integrity and Responsibility"]

[Text] Mansour Moalla, minister of finance and planning, and Abdelaziz Lasram, minister of national economy, are the leaders of the Tunisian economy in the present phase. The first draws up the plans and attracts investments and the second makes the decisions and concludes the agreements. The two men complement each other in work as well as in dialogue. It seems that they agree in their view of economic affairs. It seems that they agree on the fundamental mainstays of economic policy. AL-IQTISAD WA AL-A'MAL met and interviewed both men, separately, within the framework of its mission in Tunisia last September. Each interview lasted several hours, and as a result, it has been

possible to illustrate Tunisia's economic policy at the domestic, Arab and international levels. What has helped in this is that the two interviews were lengthy, thereby allowing enough time to cover the salient points of the issues discussed. The first session with Minister Moalla required a second session that, in turn, lasted longer than scheduled.

The first dialogue with Minister Lasram also paved the way, unexpectedly, for a second session that also lasted a long time.

We would not be exaggerating if we said that we found two men to be distinguished officials combining educational qualification with practical experience. The fact is that several qualities are fairly common at the various levels of Tunisian leadership. Tunisia's wealth, according to Minister Lasram, is in its people and in their accumulated skills and experience.

As we have already said, the two interviews complement each other. This integration is a reflection of the integration of the two men carefully controlling the rudder of the Tunisian economy on the threshold of a new decade abounding with hopes and yielding more than one transformation in Tunisia's development and in its domestic and external economic options.

Abdelaziz Lasram, the Tunisian minister of national economy, reviews in the interview with AL-IQTISAD WA AL-A'MAL the bases on which the various industrial, tourism, trade and oil activities of the economy are founded. He also reviews Tunisia's views and policy in the sphere of Arab and foreign relations. Here is the interview:

[Question] It has been said that the new oil finds in Tunisia are significant and that they may change several aspects of the given situation. What is your evaluation?

[Answer] It is impossible yet to give solid figures on the exploitable quantities in the discovered fields because this requires means of measurement and technical conditions that exceed the available capabilities. All that can be said is that there are positive indications regarding areas that had previously been considered not to contain oil because of geological factors. The new discoveries have found oil at a depth of 4,500 meters in a layer called the ordhouciem. Such discoveries had been unknown because it was believed that oil could not exist at a depth of more than 3,500 meters. Drilling operations used to be stopped if no crude was found at that depth. Perhaps it is because of these considerations that it was believed that Tunisia's oil potential was confined to the sea and to the continental shelf. But in the wake of the latest discoveries, the picture has changed and the interest of international corporations has turned anew to the terra firma, especially since the exploitation of oil there is less costly. This is evident in the fact that there are three times as many requests for prospecting on land than there are for prospecting offshore.

No Figures Can Be Announced

[Question] There is speculation to the effect that the capacity of the discovered fields may reach 4.5 million, perhaps even 10 million, tons annually.

[Answer] No figure can be given. It may turn out that the whole question is one of 100,000 tons. The opposite may also be proven and we may be facing new production of 10 million tons. No figure is meaningful yet as long as we have not entered the phase of actual production.

[Question] The issue of the [continental] shelf is now before the International Court. Speculation here also indicates great oil potential.

[Answer] The issue of the shelf has been presented to the Hague Court on the basis of an agreement between us and the brothers in Libya. Each of us has agreed to arbitration by the court insofar as the rights of the two sides to the shelf are concerned. As for the estimated energy, our information on that is less than the information we have on the new finds. The truth is that the international firms frequently play a negative role in such speculation by competing to get prospecting concessions. In any case, I must say--and I have my personal opinion on the oil issue--that Tunisia's progress has been realized because of our lack of easy money and because we have been compelled to work hard and to innovate. This has enabled us to form the most important "oil" capital because it is a capital that is undepletable, namely, the capital of the human element, skills and expertise. I don't know what oil's yield to our economy and our life will be. Perhaps it will create more problems than it will solve. I hope that if oil is found, it will be found in quantities that will enable us to do away with [oil] importation and to avoid a deficit. We certainly don't like the presence of a big "surplus" and will not work toward such a goal.

Energy Policy

[Question] Regardless of the finds and of future production estimates, what is Tunisia's policy in the oil sphere and in the energy sphere generally?

[Answer] The main goal of the Tunisian Government is to utilize the most advanced technologies and skills with the aim of surveying and discovering all the oil potential in Tunisia's land and waters. This is what we have achieved by diversifying the oil agreements and by concluding agreements with the major companies known for their expertise (Amoco, Alph Acitan, the French Oil Company, and Houston Oil). But the new and important thing is that we are now turning toward cooperation with the Arab countries that have experience in this sphere, such as Kuwait. I agreed with my colleague the Kuwaiti minister of oil when he visited Tunisia recently to form a joint company to prospect for oil in Tunisia. I have agreed with my Libyan counterpart to exchange expertise and information in the oil sphere and to form a permanent joint committee. The spheres of cooperation with the Arab brothers are unlimited, whether in the fields of exploration, investment, refining and petrochemicals or in the area of gas utilization. In refining, we have a plan to expand the present capacity of the refinery, increasing it from 1.5 million tons to 6 million tons annually. Our current consumption is close to 3.5 million tons, and this means that we need to import 2 million tons every year.

As far as energy policy is concerned, we are preparing our plans on the basis of starting from the data we have at present. According to these data,

Tunisia will be importing oil in 7 or 8 years because of the gradual decline in production from the fields that are currently being utilized and because consumption is increasing at an annual rate of 11 and 12 percent. It is known that consumption of some oil products, such as fuel oil, gas oil and liquid gas for home use, is rising at a higher rate. In light of these factors, I prepared a plan for the use of alternative energies, including nuclear energy, especially since Tunisia can produce from 100 to 110 tons of uranium per year. We have a joint project with Kuwait in this area that would enable us to provide fuel for a generator with a capacity of 1,100 megawatts.

Tunisia's production capacity now does not exceed 700 megawatts even though these figures are changing every year due to the fact that consumption is changing. Estimates indicate that Tunisia will need a thermal plant with a 300-megawatt capacity every 2 years.

Tourism: Choice and Necessity

The Choice: Tourism stimulated the economy, improved the quality of production, took areas out of the slump they were in, launched complementary activities and strengthened current accounts.

The Necessity: Tourism involves perils that are certain if people do not stick together nationally and if the government is weak.

[Question] In the opinion of some people the tourist sector in Tunisia has its advantages and its drawbacks. Can Tunisia as an Islamic country contain the social complications of growth in tourism?

[Answer] In economics, in any economy, there are no choices that are altogether positive. The problem is always confined to the achievement of economic growth along with the treatment of inescapable problems and aftereffects, not only in tourism but also in industry, in agriculture and in any contemporary economic activity.

I believe that tourism was a successful choice in Tunisia because the Tunisian economy developed thanks to tourism. Tunisia had to develop in a manner that was consistent with the needs and services that were required by tourists, who were generally Westerners. This required that we commit ourselves to manufacturing or producing certain high quality goods, compared to the standard to which Tunisia was accustomed. Today, for example, the fabrics, home furniture, decorating materials, lumber, ceramics, air conditioners and elevators that we produce are excellent by European standards. This is due to tourism. The same is true of even agricultural production. If excellent quality agricultural products are offered today with special displays, it is because producers from the outset had to go along with European taste, and they continued to do so after acquiring the necessary techniques.

Because of tourism many areas in Tunisia have developed and stayed in step with the age. If we were to consider many of the projects that were started

with the cooperation of European agencies, we would note that the basis for their establishment was tourism in Tunisia. The fact that the millions who visit Tunisia have made the country well-known in Europe and what happened with our Kuwaiti and Saudi brothers as well were due to one far-sighted person: President Bourguiba. He was the one who decided that tourism was necessary. He was the one who recognized its economic significance when no one else recognized the importance of this sector and its future potential. Tourism gives one an open door to the world. Closing a country to tourism would inevitably be followed by economic gloom.

Finally, reference must be made to an important aspect of tourism. The tourist sector indirectly stimulates numerous production sectors in industry, agriculture, services and other sectors, especially since about 90 percent of the products that are used to furnish and provide hotels with supplies are Tunisian. Tourism then constitutes a basic market for hundreds of production projects in the country.

Thanks to President Bourguiba

Tourism then was a sound choice. This choice...[words missing]. A tourist official in Tunisia told me that all the progress that took place in Tunisia, especially in the area of tourism, was due to the fact that every foreign or Tunisian investor felt that he was protected by President Bourguiba.

[Question] But how can the negative effects [of tourism] be remedied?

[Answer] It is impossible for tourism not to have some consequences on social, behavioral and economic areas. But these consequences in my view remain limited. Tourism does in fact become fraught with danger when people who are involved in it are backward, when their national character is not cohesive and when they lack the faith that would protect them and the national administration that can confront and contain these consequences.

On the other hand, tourism has positive consequences even in the behavioral and social realm because it makes Tunisians aware of modes of dealing with people and of civilian conduct. Such an awareness has enriched the experiences and character of Tunisians.

We Are Not Dependent on Tourism

Tourism is causing apprehension on the economic scene because it is a "sensitive" sector that relies on conditions over which the country in general has no control. But what does tourism in Tunisia represent? It represents at most about 4.5 percent of the national revenue. Most likely it will not exceed this rate. Tunisia cannot become like Puerto Rico or the Balearic Islands, for example, where tourism constitutes the only source of revenue.

In the area of employment, tourism now provides direct employment for about 35,000 citizens. Tunisia creates about 42,000 jobs annually. This, too, shows the limited importance of tourism in the area of employment.

As far as the effects of tourist spending on average prices are concerned, no concrete and serious effect has been noticed so far. The volume of tourist consumption [compared to] total national consumption is marginal. During the day the maximum number of tourists in Tunisia is between 80,000 and 100,000. What effect would their consumption have on that of 6.5 million Tunisians? The Tunisian himself consumes a fair amount of goods and services, and he is also experiencing a continuing rise in his standard of living. This in itself is the most important and the principal ingredient in the growth of domestic demand.

Industry and Its Prospects

I told the French that we did not need industry for assembling automobiles and "If you do not transfer technology to us, we will open our markets to the Japanese and keep you out of our markets."

"We forced car manufacturing companies to manufacture all automobile parts locally."

[Question] What is the current status of industry in Tunisia and what are its directions in the next stage?

[Answer] There are several kinds of industries, and each one has its situation and its special policy.

There is, first, heavy industry, such as the chemical industry, which uses phosphates. There is, for example, the phosphoric acid and phosphate products industry. There are other industries that produce fertilizers. In this respect, Tunisia is considered to be in an advanced position. Its goal is to keep the ratio between the phosphate ore it produces for export and the phosphate products it produces for use in the fertilizer industry at 75 percent for products produced for factories and 25 percent for export as phosphate ore.

We also have heavy industry in the areas of steel and cement. At present, Tunisia's total cement production approaches 1 million tons. There is a new production line or a new plant every 2 or 3 years. We also have an advanced oil refining industry and advanced heavy machinery production such as the boiler industry.

The second area in importance is that of the textile and ready-made clothing industry. Tunisia's production in this area is excellent, and the exports of this sector rank fourth after oil, tourism and phosphates. All our textile production is exported to Europe. There is an unlimited free zone law in this industry that was set up by Law No 1972 allowing foreign investments, especially from large companies that produce ready-made clothing, to be brought into this export sector. The law has now been changed so as to encourage Tunisians who want to export. It applies to them the exemptions and incentives that are granted to the free zones.

Third, there is the food industry, which processes part of our agricultural production.

There is, finally, the sector of miscellaneous industries, especially the mechanical industries. Tunisia sets much store on the mechanical and electrical industries, and we are also turning gradually to the field of electronics because it is the field of the future.

Significant Agreements With the Automobile Industry

[Question] You have concluded significant agreements with some automobile manufacturing companies that are world-famous. What has Tunisia achieved in this area?

[Answer] We have reached agreements with the companies working in our country, like Peugeot, Renault and General Motors, whereby Tunisia was able to get two major concessions from the companies:

1. Tunisia is to select 30 percent of the cars that are assembled [in the country] for export to the home country or to the European market in general. We would choose the cars at random, and our principal purpose is to ensure good quality and the fact that what the company produces for the local market is as good as what it produces in its worldwide market.

2. We also required these companies to abide by a formula according to which they would introduce the manufacturing of automobile spare parts in Tunisia so that production of that sector would ultimately equal 75 percent of the value of the production of automobiles assembled locally. That is, in return for producing, for example, assembled automobiles for 1 million dinars, the companies would have to produce locally motor parts and other devices for the cars with Tunisian labor to equal 750,000 dinars. They must also use these parts in their automobile engines in their principal factories in the home country or elsewhere in the world.

Some people thought that these proposals would be risky. But we proposed them, and we got them. Peugeot has now begun producing excellent steel pistons--thousands of them every year. For that purpose, they built a steel melting furnace. They are also producing the inside parts of engines, the inside parts of mufflers and so forth. We are always promoting what they manufacture. If it exceeds what they gather over a certain limit, we require them to increase the spare parts production so that the percentage will stay at 75 percent. Our goal is to attain 100 percent and 120 percent in the future. The fact is that if we consider that the cars are evaluated in Tunisia, not taking into account the cost of transportation to foreign markets, the manufacturing rate we get reaches 85 percent. We get this advantage (namely, deducting the transportation cost when evaluating the final product) because we are a developing country. A decision was made by the French Government in this regard in harmony with the recommendations of international organizations, especially UNCTAD. We will deal with Volkswagen on the same basis in the near future.

Assembling Is Industry in Appearance Only

[Question] There is a basic question here, namely: What interest do these companies have in making these concessions, which may constitute a precedent?

[Answer] They have a definite interest because they are in the phase of strong competition among themselves. Through these agreements, the companies guarantee a share of the market and reduce the cost of the unit produced. But what is important is that you dictate your conditions to the companies in return for this interest and for the sake of your own interest. My initial and simple analysis with the French, at the time when Giscard d'Estaing was president, was as follows: I told them that we are a people who use the French language. If we don't get a transfer of technology from the French, then how can we turn to the Germans or the Japanese and ask them for such a transfer? I told them: You shoulder a major responsibility in this regard. Otherwise, I need no assembly industry because it is an industry in appearance only. In such a case, I would rather close the Tunisian market to you and import Japanese cars.

Naturally, they had to choose one of the two options and they opted to accept our conditions. It is also in their interest that we learn their interest that we learn their technology, even if gradually, because this is the only path open to us.

[Question] In your assessment, can this precedent be spread to other sectors and industries?

[Answer] Certainly. We will not confine ourselves to cars. We will apply similar agreements to other sectors, for example, with the CGE company.

I have no doubt that when a country knows how to present its analysis of the circumstances and how to use its negotiating power to maximum advantage it can obtain important gains. When the elements of a big market, such as the Arab Maghreb or the Arab East, are available, we can then imagine the negotiating power we will have vis-a-vis the multinational companies on such issues as that of the transfer of technology. What is the transfer of technology? It is the outcome of a series of gains, that is, an agreement with this firm and another agreement with that one. In time, a complete fabric of know-how, expertise and technology becomes available. This is the climate that creates industry and scientific progress.

The agreement we have concluded with Renault, for example, is not the same as the only one we have concluded with Peugeot. With Renault, we have agreed that they will manufacture in Tunisia the (two doors) and the electronic and electrical system on the dashboard. Our purpose is to learn something new from every firm. Should we manufacture this system with the same precision with which it is manufactured in Europe, then why shouldn't we export to France, Iraq or any other country at competitive prices after a while?

With Joint Arab Negotiating Power We Will Produce a Car

[Question] Will you be able to produce a complete car after a while?

[Answer] If we continue to be confined to the Tunisian market, this will be impossible. We need a market that absorbs at least 200,000 cars annually. This figure exceeds the capacity of the entire Arab Maghreb market. However, we must proceed on this path to the furthest extent possible. It is our duty not to tie ourselves to certain sectors, such as the textile industry, which is doomed [makhum 'alayh]. The cement and steel industries are industries that consume energy at high rates. It is better to turn to industries that produce an added value and create a base of expertise and technology. But this requires big and hard efforts, ceaseless negotiations and pressures. But to realize this, foreigners have to come to our country. Here, we again stress the importance of tourism and of creating an atmosphere that encourages firms to come to us and that encourages engineers and technicians to settle in Tunisia. This is unlikely to happen without the presence of stability, of easy transportation and of restaurants, hotels and means of entertainment.

Ramifications of Expanded European Market

[Question] What are the likely ramifications to Tunisia of an expanded European Common Market?

[Answer] The problem is the stronger possibility of continued recession rather than the possibility of expansion. This is because our exchange with the European Common Market is varied and because Tunisian exports are not of such an effective volume that they can be exposed to the dangers of the tendency toward protectionism and toward the creation of barriers, especially since we have special agreements and relations with the market.

In any case, the commodity that may be most affected is olive oil. But this effect will diminish that with the development of Tunisian consumption, which is growing at high rates. We produce nearly 120,000 tons of olive oil and export large amounts of this production. But we now consume nearly 105,000 tons of oils. We also import soybean oil and other kinds of oil so as to benefit from our olive oil exports.

Balance of Trade Deficit

[Question] How can Tunisia's balance of trade deficit with the industrial countries be corrected?

[Answer] Our main censure for these countries is not so much the quantitative deficit in the exchange as it is the qualitative deficit, that is, the pattern of conventional exchange between manufactured goods on the one hand and agricultural products and mineral raw materials on the other. The fact is that the concept of bilateral balance in the balance of trade (i.e., the balance between one country and another or one country on the one hand and a group of countries on the other) is an obsolete concept that has only relative importance. What is important is the general balance and the pattern of exchange and not the balance of accounts between two countries. The oil countries, for example, have a surplus in their balance of trade with the industrial countries. Should we rejoice and feel reassured because of this? Tunisia, for another example, can export crude phosphate and labor to Europe and import engineers

and manufactured goods in return. The balance will be established but will we be in good shape? The issue goes beyond quantitative balance to the type and equality of the relationship.

I once told the Germans: I don't blame you if you set up customs barriers in the face of my products because you have your own problems. But I blame you when you set up such barriers any time you wish and without any real consultation with me as a partner and a party with interests and circumstances that you must take into consideration. Without equality, the relationship turns into a colonialist one and we don't accept this kind of dealing, of course.

Trade With Maghreb Countries

[Question] Are your trade relations with the Maghreb developing?

[Answer] There is development with Libya and good relations with Algeria. Our exports to Libya totaled nearly 100 million dollars in the first 6 months of this year. This is due to the fact that the Libyan consumer is used to Tunisian products. We import from Libya the greater part of our oil derivatives. As for Algeria, there is a climate for big improvement, especially due to the positive policy being followed and to the openness of our Algerian brothers to cooperation and joint projects with Tunisia.

The volume of our exports to Algeria is close to 25 million dollars annually. As for Morocco, the rate is still low due to difficult transportation. Our exports to Morocco do not exceed 2-4 million dollars annually.

Of course, such rates are negligible compared with the volume of each of the three countries' trade with Europe and the world. This reflects clearly that the Maghreb economy is still disjointed and that, consequently, we must exert serious efforts for further integration and interdependence.

Mansour Moalla, the Tunisian minister of finance and economy [sic], reviews in this interview the fundamental mainstays of the sixth development plan. The final touches of this plan have not yet been applied. The interview also extends to include Arab investment affairs in Tunisia and the bases of cooperation with the Arab Maghreb countries and the Arab East countries. The interview covers other points as well. Here is the interview:

[Question] Have the final broad lines of the Sixth Five-Year Plan, which you are preparing, crystallized yet?

[Answer] What has crystallized so far are the semifinal lines. These are now being discussed by the ministries and by the Council of Ministers. It is expected that the final figures will be ready by the end of the current year or the beginning of next year when the 1980 and 1981 figures will have become available to us. In drawing up a medium-range economic plan, the problem is not just that of the needed investments and their sources but also the need to balance investment volume, the means of financing it, its distribution to the various sectors and its impact on production, the export sector, labor

and the balance of payments. The state has goals in each of these spheres and no conflict should rise among these goals. It must be acknowledged that balancing these goals is not easy.

Distinguishing Characteristics of New Plan

[Question] What are the goals distinguishing the new plan compared with the previous plans?

[Answer] There are several characteristics distinguishing the new plan:

First, the major part of the investments, which will total 8 billion dinars (\$15.5 million), will be spent on the producing sector. A total of 60-70 percent of the investments in the First 10-Year Plan (the 1960's) was channeled to the infrastructures and for completing utilities because the French had left the country with no roads, utilities, hospitals or schools. The producing sector's share of the investments improved in the Second 10-Year Plan (the 1970's), amounting to 60 percent compared with 40 percent for the infrastructures. But now we hope to allocate 65 percent of all investments for production compared with 35 percent for completion, maintenance and improvement of the infrastructures.

The second distinguishing characteristic of the plan is that it does not focus on the sectors that consume large capital, such as the energy, cement or chemical industries sector. The plan focuses more strongly on the sectors that employ labor. The volume of labor employment is scheduled to total 30 percent of the investments compared with 20 percent in the fifth plan. We expect to create nearly 280,000 employment opportunities by the end of the sixth plan. This meets to some extent the expected additional demand, estimated at 310,000-315,000 employment opportunities. Determination of the demand volume in the labor market depends on the criteria employed, meaning the age at which an individual is considered of working age, whether it is 15 or 18 years, and the percentage of women seeking work and so forth.

The third distinguishing characteristic of the new plan is its reliance on the expected development in agricultural production. We estimate, for example, that production will develop at a real growth rate of 6.8 percent. But to realize this rate, a growth rate of no less than 5 percent must be realized in the agricultural sector. This is important because agriculture is a difficult sector, which achieved an annual growth rate of only 1.7 percent in the previous plan. Naturally, this goal will require big investments in the various grain, livestock and fishing sectors.

The fourth distinguishing characteristic of this plan is that it initiates a reduction in the balance of trade deficit due to the realization of an export growth rate higher than the expected import growth rate. So far, the opposite has been happening. Imports have developed at an annual rate of 12 percent at fixed prices whereas exports have developed at the rate of only 8 percent, thus leading to an increase in the balance of trade deficit in the past 5 years. Though we have been able to overcome this deficit, thanks to the rise in oil and phosphate prices and the development of tourism revenues--all

of which are factors that have helped to reduce the impact of the balance of trade deficit to a large extent--the situation is now different. Oil prices are not rising and this means that it will not be possible to rely on oil to absorb the deficit in the commodity balances. Therefore, the plan must be geared to realize an increase in exports, especially in phosphate, in tourism (which is an export service) and in industry (according to the plan, the increase in exports is expected to amount to 1.8 percent annually compared with an annual growth rate of 5.3 percent in imports).

Potential of Oil Finds

[Question] But isn't the picture expected to change with the reports of new oil finds?

[Answer] First, there are reservations regarding the estimates and significance of the discovered quantities. However, there are big hopes. Some technical sources have mentioned the figure of 1 million tons annually, with the possibility of more. New wells have been drilled but all is mere speculation so far. Whatever the volume, the impact of oil will not be felt before the end of the sixth plan because the exploitation processes requires time and preparation. But, naturally, this improves the financial standing of Tunisia and enables it to borrow from international sources on better terms.

[Question] Will the sixth plan take Tunisia out of the sphere of the developing countries?

[Answer] The question depends on the meaning of getting out of the sphere of backwardness. If the criterion is improvement of individual income, then this income has reached \$1,000 per capita annually. This is one of the highest per capita income rates in the developing countries. Moreover, the sixth plan will lead to a real annual growth of 3 percent in individual income because the expected income increase is 5.5 percent and the increase in population is 2.5 percent. But if the means of getting out of the circle is that we will dispense with the need for foreign financing, then this will not happen within the framework of this plan, not even by the end of the next plan. In this regard, we are exerting efforts to raise the Arab investment share of foreign financing. We expect that this share will rise to 50 percent in this plan compared with 20 percent in the fifth plan.

[Question] The issue of the Arab share of investments brings up some points against which one should guard. Any change in this aspect will upset the equation, especially since the conditions of the Arab world are unstable to start with.

[Answer] The issue is delicate, of course. But every plan is itself a difficult equation tied to numerous changeables. Were it not for the presence of difficulties, there would be no need for planning. Developing agriculture at a rate of 5 percent is not easy, for example. Completing investments valued at \$16 billion is not easy. Developing 280,000 working citizens is not a simple matter. Gathering \$3 in foreign financing for the next 5 years is not easy either.

Population Growth Between Intimidation and Inducement

[Question] What draws attention in Tunisia, as in other developing countries, is that population growth consumes the greater part of the development efforts. But with the level of awareness existing in Tunisia, cannot a real solution be devised for this problem?

[Answer] The population growth rate in Tunisia is still high despite the pioneer efforts we have exerted in the sphere of birth control. The mortality rate has dropped sharply. But the birth rate has also dropped. This rate was 44 per thousand in the 1960's and has now dropped to 34 per thousand, meaning that we have realized a drop of 10 points, but "every point realized with torture" (he said with a laugh). We must focus on reducing this rate to 26 or 27 per thousand in the current decade, thus reducing the population growth rate to 7 [sic] percent. There is in Tunisia a birth control organization, an active Women's Federation and constant enlightenment efforts.

[Question] Perhaps the matter requires an effective policy in the sphere of incentives and "deterrents."

[Answer] We have not yet entered the sphere of "intimidation." We pay a family compensation for four children only. We have raised the marriage age, making it 17 for women and 20 for men. There is a legacy that, naturally, generates resistance [to our birth control efforts]. But we are still better off than some developing countries where it is not even permitted to talk of birth control because it is a form of "atheism."

In the current plan, we must move forward, even if only a little, in the sphere of indirect "intimidation." Of course, we are not going to say that we will imprison whoever produces many children, as they have done in China (he said laughingly). But the individual who helps us in the battle to improve life and to control births will have the priority in employment, in housing and in other opportunities, meaning that we have begun to think of a policy of incentives and deterrents. A responsible statesman cannot turn a blind eye to what will happen in the 1990's if the situation continues to be as it is now. But regrettably, public opinion is only concerned with today or tomorrow. When talking of the 1990's, it is as if we are shouting in a desert with nobody to hear or respond.

Arab Investment in Tunisia

[Question] At the Conference on Arab Investment in the Arab Homeland held in Tunisia last year, you made known your intention to issue special regulations and to provide special incentives to encourage Arab investors. Has anything of the sort been done and does the plan include a bill to this effect?

[Answer] We have dealt with this matter so far by establishing the proper formulas in the bilateral agreements, as, for example, in the agreements we have signed with the development banks (Kuwaiti, Saudi, French and Qatari) and in the agreement with Kuwait in the sphere of fertilizers and chemicals.

All these agreements have introduced great flexibility to the sphere of investment and of the tax facilities and exemptions offered to investment. But we are not thinking at present of issuing a special law for Arab investment in Tunisia because there is a need to harmonize the concept of nationalism [al-muwatanah] with the investor's rights. We say that the Arab investor must get more deeply involved with Tunisian society within the framework of the general plan by which the Tunisians abide. This imposes on him certain duties and requires him not to make his investment's goal a purely exploitive goal. On the other hand, it must be acknowledged that although the Arab investor has his rights, he has no power in the country in which he has settled because power is in the hands of the Tunisians. So how can the investor be protected in this situation and what rights is he given in return for the commitments of nationalism?

Naturally, Arab nationalism cannot be asked of and the counterrights cannot be given to the foreign investor. This distinction insofar as the Arab is concerned requires thinking and then the crystallization of this thinking and its introduction into legislation. We will hold a conference in October 1982 to study the issue. God willing, we will have something ready by then.

[Question] Are there obstacles in the face of issuing legislation to this effect?

[Answer] Some psychological obstacles must be overcome, especially in the issue of real estate and agriculture. We have heard, for example, that investment is some kind of "colonization." This word has been accepted by public opinion and this means that the concept of [Arab] nationalism must be introduced more strongly to Tunisian public opinion. There are bitter memories from the experience with the French colonists. This experience has made us say that the land belongs to the Tunisians alone. Preparation of the climate is being now done through bilateral projects and special agreements. Joint banks, for example, are considered one of the means because we view them as Tunisian establishments and not as foreign establishments. Consequently, they have the right to invest exactly like a Tunisian.

Arab Investment Is Not Colonization

[Question] Concerning agricultural investments, we have learned that some distance still separates what the government offers and what the investors consider essential guarantees for investment. What is your evaluation?

[Answer] The problem does exist and we are exerting efforts to solve the complex issues concerning agricultural land ownership. The fact is that Tunisian law permits the ownership of agricultural land by government or semigovernment establishments, without defining when an establishment is reached on this aspect in a manner that gives Arab investors the necessary guarantees insofar as land is concerned, then we can pave the path with projects in state-owned lands first (there are nearly 400,000 hectares of top quality state-owned lands). The Economic Development Bank (BDET) has a project to exploit 7,000 hectares. The Tunisian-Kuwaiti Bank also has a project and the Tunisian-Saudi Investment Company has its projects. It is my

conviction that the sensitivity over the issue of land is political and emanates from the residues of French colonialism. Arab investment cannot be considered like the French and we must, consequently, welcome and receive it.

Psychological Problem That Has To Be Tackled

[Question] But as for individual projects, the land necessary for such a project cannot be owned by a non-Tunisian?

[Answer] Individual investments can start in the form of long-term leases for 30 or 50 years. Naturally, a problem emerges here, namely, that banks that wish to loan agricultural projects require guarantees. Such guarantees cannot be serious unless the land is mortgaged. The right of investment cannot be mortgaged and does not constitute a guarantee in itself. Moreover, the movable equipment of an agricultural project does not constitute a significant percentage of the investment. On the other hand, the individual investor must get used to this formula, especially since he is not compelled to freeze a fixed and unmovable capital in agricultural investment.

In any case, the best formula is the formula of companies. The banks prefer to deal with such companies because everything in the project in this case is the property of the individual with legal status embodied in the company and nobody can dispose of this property because it is tied to the investment. We are thinking at present of solving the psychological difficulties reflected in the law through an article banning the Tunisian from investing in joint stock agricultural companies. Why? Because French colonialism originally came in the form of companies. For example, Les Fermes Francais de Tunisie owned 12,000 hectares of the best lands.

[Question] But does the Tunisian actually fear investors from Sharjah, Qatar or others? Can these people become colonists?

[Answer] The truth is that the fear is not so much of the Arab investor as it is of the rise of an "internal colonialism" through the increased concentration of farmland ownership, meaning the renewed emergence of the firms that we knew in the days of the French, with only one difference--namely, that they will be owned by Tunisians. Naturally, there are still calls for the distribution of lands and the division of ownerships. But the people have begun to realize the negative effects of the fragmentation of ownership on production, productivity and the ability to use modern technologies.

Financial Banking Structure

[Question] Financing the sixth plan raises a question concerning the effectiveness of the Tunisian banking and financial structure in mobilizing savings and financing projects.

[Answer] There is interest in developing the domestic financial market by bolstering the banks' role and their ability to finance. We have raised the minimum capital of any bank to 5 million Tunisian dinars (nearly \$10 million) and we are thinking of raising this minimum to 10 million dinars. As for

interest rates, they have also risen tangibly. Savings interest has risen from 7 percent to 9 and 9.5 percent. The interest on loans has risen from 8.75 percent to 10.5 percent for medium-range loans. As for long-term loans, we pay 11 percent and more for them. But the financial market, in the real sense of its being a market for the exchange of securities and stocks and for providing capital for projects, still needs to be strengthened and developed.

[Question] The introductory note on the sixth plan contains extremely daring ideas for reforming the administration, taxes, currency and investment. Do you think that the climate is suitable for acceptance of the proposed reforms?

[Answer] All that can be said is that we are preparing the necessary grounds. This is difficult and exhausting work by its nature. We are trying to face the issue of administration by intensifying decentralization to make the provinces aware of their responsibilities for numerous matters. For example, the general director of customs is still compelled to sign a decision granting leave to a civil servant in the southernmost part of Tunisia. Why should the director of customs decide this when he doesn't know the civil servant or the job conditions in his center? Why shouldn't the provincial director take over this responsibility? Naturally, these are the residues of the Napoleonic administration. There is always the need for coverage from a higher official. The civil servant always seeks coverage and he has no incentive to take the initiative and to shoulder responsibility.

Maghreb Integration: You Hear Same Language

[Question] Tunisia's industry faces a certain condition. The Arab Gulf market is remote, the European market is not open and the Maghreb market is not unified. There is also duplication and similarity in numerous industries. How do you view Tunisia's industrial future in light of these conditions?

[Answer] There is no doubt that Tunisia's industry needs primarily a framework of Maghreb cooperation. This is what we are working and hoping for. The fact is that we have discovered in our latest visit to Algeria the possibilities of integration in a number of machine industries. Before the visit, there was the idea that this or that country can do everything. The language has now changed and there is some sort of a reexamination. Why have we established a bank with Algeria? Because the officials in the two countries have now discovered that there are at least 40 industrial projects that we can implement jointly. These projects require financing of nearly 200 million dinars (about \$400 million), and we have found nothing better than to establish a joint bank to study the dossiers of the proposed projects and to determine which of these projects is moderate and feasible and then provide the necessary financing either directly or through participation in the projects.

As for relations with Libya, we also hope to create the grounds for mutual respect and common interest. For example, brother Abu Zayd Durdah, the Libyan economy secretary, visited me today and I told him frankly: If the issue is one of uniting two flags, then you know our opinion of this. But if you want us to set up a joint plant or to realize a bond between our economies, then we agree, and we are ready.

: Action Is More Difficult

[Question] Doesn't joint Arab action open certain possibilities for Tunisia?

[Answer] Action at the Arab level is more difficult and complex. There is divergence in the regimes and divergence in the markets. The gulf market, for example, is open and free. This is what we have raised with the Saudi and Kuwaiti brothers. We have told them: There is a big difference. Our markets are protected and this is what has helped us create some industries. But you have no customs protection on what is imported. So can you show me how Tunisian textiles can compete with Taiwan's and Korea's products? This requires a miracle. Therefore, it is not enough to say, as they have said to me in the Common Arab Market treaty, that customs barriers among the Arab countries must be lowered. If we loosen the restrictions in Tunisia, Korean textiles will invade us via Saudi Arabia or elsewhere. What we must seek to achieve is to unify the customs barrier by bringing the customs fees closer to each other in 20 years. For example, Saudi Arabia will raise its barrier gradually and Tunisia will lower its barrier gradually until we meet at a certain point where a customs barrier is formed, as has happened in the European Common Market.

I know, of course, that Saudi Arabia is an importing country and that they will say that increased fees will be reflected in the prices. But reducing the fees will reflect on my ability to compete in some industries and will also saddle me with losses. What is important in any case is to eliminate the barriers between us, thus reassuring Tunisian textiles that they have priority over Korean products in the Saudi and Kuwaiti market and reassuring the Saudis and the Kuwaitis that their petrochemical products have the same protection in Tunisia as in Saudi Arabia.

[Question] Does Tunisian industry have sufficient competitive ability to enter the Gulf market, for example?

[Answer] This requires time and the presence of the framework that I have just mentioned.

[Question] Meaning that the Maghreb framework remains closer to mind?

[Answer] True. Our endeavors with Algeria, Morocco and Libya are easier to realize, though they must be continued patiently and persistently. The problem here is not so much an economic problem as it is the problem of the effects of the past that continue until the present. What we hope for is that all recourse is to the path of realism. In any case, we have called the bank that we have established with Algeria the Arab Maghreb Cooperation Bank, perhaps on the strength of the saying: "Hope for good and you will find it."

[Question] Social peace is an issue that concerns the investor. Is there a framework and are there formulas under preparation to guarantee this peace in the long run?

[Answer] When we came with the cabinet of Mr Mohamed Mzali, the situation was very difficult. Unionists were in jail and under trial but now they have all been released and they have held their congress normally, despite the attempts to create confusion at the time.

The truth is that the problem of the federation [of labor] is that it had exceeded the limit accepted by the Tunisians and had tried to break the law of coexistence that regulates the relations of the social classes with each other and with the state.

The workers have their federation to defend their rights. There are other groups in society that have their organizations and their interests. Above these factional interests is a common interest that requires the observation of certain rules in settling disputes and in arbitration between interests when they come into conflict. If each group is not constantly aware of the limit that it may not exceed, then we will have the law of the jungle. It is not the right of a single group to paralyze, for example, the economy and to block the country's life. We cannot ignore the country's interest under the pretext of defending labor's rights.

[Question] Let us return to the question of the framework. Are you in the process of establishing a certain formula "to absorb the shocks" and to manage the social dialogue?

[Answer] After the wounds and the healing of the wounds, we initiated the dialogue with utter sincerity. The federation chairman was jailed and was sentenced to a 10-year prison term. He is now [free and] the chairman of the federation. A few days ago, there was a meeting between a government delegation and a federation delegation in which we debated and discussed matters. This is the best proof of the climate we seek to maintain.

As for the formula, there are several proposals. We are thinking, for example, of replacing the Economic and Social Council by a council for national economic and social dialogue that will include the Federation of Labor, the Federation of Businessmen and the federation of women and students so that all these groups can take part in all the plans and projects that we prepare for the economy or for organizing society and so that they can have full opportunity to take part in decisions and then abide by them. They tell you: We will not abide because we do not participate. So we tell them: Come and participate. This is what we want. Let everyone state his opinion. I will point out to you the reality and the limits of the possible and if you have an alternative solution, then give it to me. I say that I can create 280,000 job opportunities in 5 years. You ask me to increase investments to create more job opportunities and I will show you how this will result in increased indebtedness by the country and how it will affect Tunisia's financial reputation.

This is the framework I wish would control the actions of all of the groups. Democracy and dialogue require a sense of responsibility and you should not approve any strike out of obedience to the base that elects you and with disregard for the interests of the whole. Before anything else, leadership is

integrity and courage and not a matter of going along with the crowd under all circumstances or acting as a mere agent of narrow factional interests.

Abdelaziz Lasram, Man of Negotiations

Born in Tunis in 1928.

Married with one son and two daughters, one of them studying medicine and the other law.

He obtained his law degree from Paris and graduated from ENA [National Management Institute] in 1956.

Immediately upon returning to Tunisia, he was appointed technical adviser at the Ministry of Planning and then at the Ministry of Finance and Planning.

In 1965, he was assigned by President Bourguiba to deal with the consequences of the confrontation with the French after the Bizerte incidents and to restore normalcy to the relations. He continued this mission until 1970.

In 1972, he was appointed chairman and director general of the Tunisian National Bank.

He entered the cabinet for the first time in 1974 as minister of economy, a post he held until 1977.

In 1977, he moved to work in the private sector and headed the Maghreb Insurance Company.

He was reappointed minister of economy in April [year not specified].

Recently, he was appointed member of the Political Council, the highest political authority in Tunisia.

His hobby is sports and as chairman of the African Club, he plays a role in directing sports at the national level.

His most prominent qualities are his clarity and his avoidance of the lime-light. He rarely gives a press interview and he works hard. He has a strong personality and is a skillful negotiator, especially when the matter concerns Tunisia's interests vis-a-vis the outside world.

Mansour Moalla

He was born in (Sfaqs) on 1 May 1930.

He received his law degree in 1961 and earned a doctorate in law and a diploma in higher political studies in 1954.

In 1956, he graduated from the ENA [National Management Institute] of Paris with the degree of financial inspector.

He started his work in 1957 as a technical adviser in the Ministry of Finance and in 1958 was appointed general director of the Central Bank when he was only 28.

He was appointed director of the General Administration twice and then director of the National Management Institute from 1963 to 1967 when he was appointed undersecretary of the Ministry of Industry.

Appointed undersecretary of the Ministry of Post and Communications and then minister of posts and communications in 1969.

He was appointed (acting) minister of planning affairs in 1970 and then minister of planning from 1971 to 1975.

He was elected a member of the Political Council of the Socialist Destour Party in 1971 and party assistant secretary general from 1971 to 1973.

He founded the International Arab Bank of Tunisia and was simultaneously chairman of the bank and of the Tunisian Insurance Consortium in 1975 and 1976.

He is married and has four children.

His hobby is swimming.

His most prominent qualities are his clarity and frankness. These qualities explain the great respect he enjoys domestically and abroad. They also explain the troubles he faces every now and then as a result of this clarity and frankness.

His enormous capacity for work is the biggest problem for those working with him, especially the team that assists him at the ministry. He often begins work at 0730 and doesn't quit until the evening, and even until night at times. In this respect, he is a study in work, precision and persistence.

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